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The objective of the study is to measure and investigate the sources of gender-wage 
differentials in the Eritrean labour market. The study uses primary data drawn from 
the Income and Expenditure Household Survey collected by National Statistics Eritrea 
in 1997. 
Three separate standard wage functions for males, females and a pooled one for both 
sexes are estimated, in which, the dependent variable (semi-log monthly wage) is a 
linear function of years of schooling, experience, experience squared, hours worked, 
and dummy variables capturing, occupations, ethnicity, industry, employer, marital 
status, fighters (represents whether the individual employee belong to the group who 
participated in the army struggle for independence or not). The decomposition 
exercise involved subtracting the female wage equation from the male wage equation, 
and then the wage differential that is found is in tum decomposed using the standard 
Oaxaca -Blinder (1973) procedure. The econometric result showed that women 
earned about 66 % of what men earned. The wage differentials are decomposed into 
two components, the differential due to the measurable variables and that due to 
discrimination. The results from the decompositions of the gender-wage differentials 
show that 18 % of the wage differentials result from discrimination, while 82 % is 
accounted for by the measurable variables. These results signal that gender-wage 
differentials emanate both from human capital differences and unequal treatment in 
the labour market. 
The results from the wage equation of female workers showed that human capital 
followed by the variable fighters, hours worked per a week, marital status, industrial 
sectors, and type of employer were important determinant of female wages. Place of 
work and occupations were the least important, and ethnicity was insignificant in the 
wage determination process of the female employees. Likewise, the human capital 











variables in determining the male wages. Ethnicity, industrial sectors, employer and 
marital status were least important in the wage determination process of the male 
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Eritrea is a young and small country at the Hom of Africa, with a land area of about 
124,320 square kilometres, and an estimated popUlation size, according to Brixiova 
and Cmenetz (2001), of about 3.9 million .The exact population of Eritrean is not yet 
known because not even one census has been conducted. Eritrea gained its 
independence a fter a protracting war against Ethiopia in May 1 991, and two years 
later, following a referendum, the country was formally declared an independent state. 
The Eritrean economy, like that of many developing countries, relies on agriculture. 
Italians and the British colonized Eritrea consecutively for nearly 60 years before it 
was colonized by Ethiopia. During this period, Eritrea was relatively industrialized. In 
the 1940s the country had more than 2000 industrial firms and almost 3000 
commercial firms, despite the country's small population of less than 700,000 
(Ameberg and Pederson, 1997). The three decades-long war had a serious impact on 
the resources of the economy. It destroyed physical and human resources as well as 
training and administrative institutions. 
The suffering, of course, was extended to affect the lives of all Eritreans in general 
and the labour force in particular. Yet, the extent of damage is not known. After 
independence, the first Income and Expenditure household survey 1997 was 
conducted, which provides us with the basis for understanding gender-based wage 
differential in the labour market. The analysis that is to follow indicates that there is 
gender-wage differential in Eritrean labour market. To be more specific, female 










The wage gap could be attributed to factors that can be measured, such as differences 
in education, experience, on the job training, hours of work per a week, occupations 
and sectors, and belonging to one ethnic group, etc. In addition, those variables that 
cannot be measured like unequal treatment in the labour market proved also to be 
significant. 
1.2 The Rationale for the Study 
In Eritrea, because of the long civil war and other social reasons such as beliefs and 
culture, a significant number of households are headed by women. As shown by the 
Income and Expenditure Household Survey 1997, 24 % of the households are headed 
by women. Many empirical studies (Appleton & Pedersenl997, Glick & Sahn 1997, 
Paglin & Rufolo 1990, Isemonger& Robserst 1997, Winter 1998) show that female 
employees earn less than their male counterparts. Eritrea is no exception. Such a 
situation causes an inequality in income between the two groups and in society as a 
whole. This is because the economic consequence of a gender-wage differential will 
not be restricted to the individual female employee who is earning lower wages than 
her male counterpart. The consequences will go further to influence their dependents, 
and will create or aggravate income inequality between the two groups and in the 
country as a whole. 
Moreover as it has been proven in empirical findings that the negative consequence of 
unequal treatment of male and female employees (before or post entry) in the labour 
market is not only restricted to inequality between groups, but it is also extended to 
affect the productivity, economic growth and quality of life in the country. 
Becker (1975) argues that if a male and female employee who are perfectly substitute 
face unequally treatment in the labour market so that male favoured over the female, 
then this will have a negative effect on firm's profit. This will in turn negatively affect 











of World Population (2000) also warns that the unequal treatment of males and 
females in any form does not only harm millions of individuals worldwide, but it also 
cripples national economic growth. According to the report a 1 % increase in female 
secondary schooling may results in a 0.3 % increase in economic growth. 
Endogenous growth theories stress the important roles that human capital in general 
and female education in particular plays in growth and productivity. This is because 
women's education increases labour market participation, provides better employment 
opportunities for women, and hence raises their productivity and incomes. (Klasen, 
1999, and Blackden & Bhanu, 1998). Moreover, it is also believed that education 
raises the quality of life by improving health and labour productivity in both paid 
employment and household production, increasing the individual's access to paid 
employment, and facilitating social and political participation (Summers, 1994). 
Furthermore, if non-economic factors, like gender are taken into consideration when 
hiring or rewarding employees with the same qualifications, it will result in 
misallocation of resources in the domestic labour market and enhances migration (as 
migration increases the price (wage) of human capital) to search for higher wages 
outside the domestic market. Besides, gender discrimination in the labour market has 
a forward and backward effect on the decisions of individual workers, parents, 
teachers and other actors. 
The implication of the above explanation is that societies that discriminate on the 
basis of gender pay a significant price in terms of inequality, misallocation of 
resources and brain drain, slower economic growth and a lower quality of life. 
Given the harmful effects of the gender-wage gap to individuals, society and the 
national economy, the rationale of the study is to provide robust estimates of this gap 
for Eritrea, and hopefully create awareness and help parents, society and national 












Even though the degree of the gender-wage gap may differ from country to country, 
empirical evidence in many countries show that working women do not enjoy equal 
access, opportunity and reward in the labour market. Eritrea is no exception. The 
sources of the gender-wage gap could be due to those variables that can easily be 
measured such as human capital, or due to variables that cannot be easily measured 
such as discrimination. Hence the objective of this paper is to answer the following 
questions: 
• Is there a gender-wage gap in the Eritrean labour market? 
• If there is a gender-wage gap, to what extent can be explained by measured and 
unmeasured factors (such as discrimination)? 
• What kind of public policies should be warranted to correct the distortion? 
1.4 Structure of the Study 
The rest of the study is structured as follows. In chapter two, we discuss alternative 
theories, which attempt to explain the potential sources of gender-wage discrepancy. 
After discussing the competing theories underlying the model that are used to measure 
the gap, we proceed to describe the data used in the model and to specify the potential 
causes of the gender-wage gap. Moreover, we discuss the methodology broadly in 
chapter three. The estimation procedure, descriptive and econometric analyses, is 















Many empirical studies have revealed that female employees earn less than their male 
counterparts. No one seriously disputes the existence of a gender-wage differentiaL 
There is, however, disagreement on the causes of the wage differential. Is it a result of 
gender discrimination? Or is it a result of differences in other characteristics that are 
correlated with gender? 
Although easy to state, the questions are hard to answer mainly because it is difficult 
to pinpoint exactly the cause of each and every problem stated above. However, the 
persistent existence 0 f a wage differential between groups in general, and between 
men and women in particular, has been the subject of great interest and concern to 
labour economists. This concern has led to the emergence of the various theories. 
The existing theories on gender-wage differentials can be classified into two broad 
groups: the supply side and the demand side theories. The supply side theories suggest 
that the gender-wage gap can be explained by differences in innate abilities, acquired 
knowledge (i.e. the skills one possesses), and one's individual preferences. The 
theories that fall outside of the neoclassical paradigm suggest that the behaviour of 
employers and prevailing market conditions (such as prejudice, ignorance, monopoly 
power) are sources of a gender-wage differential. 
This section highlights the general theories that suggest the potential sources of a 
gender-wage differential. Unfortunately, this study being the first in its kind In 











2.2 Productivity Difference (Human capital theory) 
According to Human Capital Theory, workers' knowledge levels are measured by 
their levels of formal schooling. Their attainment of higher education levels implies 
higher productivity, which in tum implies higher wages (developed by Mincer, 1958, 
1962, and Becker, 1962, 1964). 
The key argument of human capital theory is that wage differences arIse from 
differences in group productivity levels. Productivity is, in tum, positively related to 
the possession of human capital, i.e. investment in education, training and work 
experience. According to human capital theory, therefore, the observed wage 
discrepancy is a result of the positive impact of human capital on productivity. Put 
differently, possessing a greater stock of human capital puts an individual into a better 
position to get a better job and in a better place to negotiate for higher wages than one 
who has lower levels of human capital. Hence, the gender-wage differential can 
basically be explained in terms of differences in productivity. 
The implication of human capital theory to the gender-wage differential is that female 
workers are less productive because they possess less stock of human capital, hence 
they can legitimately be paid lower wages than their counterpart male workers who 
are supposed to be more productive. The conclusion is that the gender-wage 
differential is justified. That is to say, there are no unjustified differences. However, 
human capital fails to take into account the following points: 
i) The feedback effect of social unfairness exercised in the labour market in the 
form of discrimination. According to Coate and Loury (1993b) the persistent 
existence of gender discrimination in the labour market can influence human 
capital investment choice both before and after an individual enters the labour 











definition, investment assumes that expenditure will result in benefits later. If 
the reward in the labour market is not attractive enough women might not be 
motivated to invest in themselves, not because they do not want to invest in 
human capital, but because they are discouraged by the outcome in the labour 
market. The question that the human capital theory fails to answer is: Do 
women invest less in themselves because they are paid less or are they paid 
less because they invest less? Human capital theory, therefore, implicitly 
ignores both the impact of discriminatory treatment in the labour market and 
the feedback effect. 
ii) Human capital theory fails to consider the wage differential that may arise as a 
result of differences in family background, cohort and peer effects and 
differences in innate ability. 
iii) The criticism of human capital theory is also extended as to whether education 
increases productivity or not. Some economists say it is ability and not 
education that boosts productivity. This argument forfeits the whole argument 
of human capital theory. 
In spite of the limitations discussed above, human capital theory has played a great 
role in shedding light on the gender-wage gap arising from less investment in 
education of women. According to Mincer (1974) women invest less in themselves 
because they leave the market to bear children, which in tum lessens their 
productivity. It is true that, in addition to the formal education, employees learn by 
doing and thus accumulate experience, which helps them to increase their 
productivity. If women leave the market to bear a child, they may end up acquiring 
less experience, hence become less productive and earn lower wages than their male 
counterparts. This can bring about a gender-wage difference as well as differences in 
the acquisition of work experience, which impacts negatively on a woman's earnings 











Premature exit from the labour market amongst women is expected to be less 
prevalent in Eritrea mainly because the majority of female employees remain in the 
labour force once they enter it for the reasons listed below: 
i) Low probability of getting a job after leaving the labour force for childbearing 
it is not easy for a woman to get a job if she leaves the market for family 
responsibilities or for any other reason. This puts pressure on women 
employees to stay in the labour force. 
ii) High level of poverty - this is to say that female workers' incomes make 
significant contributions to families' incomes. Hence, leaving the market for 
child-rearing would affect the life of the family. 
iii) Strong family relationship- even though there are no baby-sitters in Eritrea, the 
strong family relationships help or encourage female employees to resume 
working. That is to say, close relatives take care of the children in the absence 
of the female workers and hence, minimise the cost of having a child. 
2.3 Differences in Ability (Comparative advantage theory) 
In contrast to human capital theory, the comparative advantage theory suggests that 
gender-wage differences may arise from innate endowments or biological differences. 
For instance, men are physically stronger than female workers. Similarly, motherhood 
is uniquely a female's job. Palling and Rufolo (1999) suggest that individuals have 
different initial attributes that determine comparative advantages in producing 
different kinds of human capitaL It is stated that there is an ability difference between 
men and women. Therefore, according to this theory, individuals, just like in the 
production of goods market, may end up producing human capital in the fields they 
can most easily succeed in, or would choose to work in occupations that are less 
demanding. Since fields of study, occupation and wages are highly correlated, the 











abilities. To put the above explanation in the words of Wonacott and Wonacott 
(1986:728), "An individual's income may be higher because of some specific talents 
or ability: Tome Aston was born with a great natural ability to hit golf; others are born 
with a special talent for solving mathematical problems". Therefore, those individuals 
who are born with special talents might enjoy easy access to higher paying 
occupations such as engineering. 
Other empirical studies also prove that both quantity and quality of schooling account 
for a sizeable part of the race-based wage gap (Card & Kruger, 1992). However, 
quality of schooling is far more vital in explaining the male-female wage gap 
(Ploachek, 1 978), which could possibly bet he result 0 f differences inc omparative 
advantage. Differences in educational qualifications might be indications of pre-
existing differences in ability (Marshall et ai, 1980). The income differential in this 
case is not attributed to the differences in the stock of human capital but to the 
difference in the ability that produces the type of the human capital. 
Ability is not a concept restricted to talent alone, but also incorporates tolerance and 
patience (in short, it includes all innate abilities). As stated by Altonji and Blank 
(1999), if unskilled employees who are tolerant of dirty or risky jobs are mainly male, 
then men will largely fill these jobs. This kind of job segregation could result in 
compensating differentials between men and women. In addition to this, if a male 
worker is a better match physically for some occupations, he may enjoy wage premia 
over a female worker in these occupations. 
The implication of comparative advantage theory to gender-wage gap analysis is that 
men and women choose different fields of study, and differ in tolerance and physical 
fitness, and this may help to explain the gender-wage gap. This is because field of 












Although the theory cannot adequately explain the gender-wage differential, it 
suggests the potential source of wage differential. 
2.4 Differences in Preferences (Difference in group preferences theory) 
The discussion of group differences in preferences is emphasized mainly in the gender 
difference in wages rather than race or ethnic differences. Altonji and Blank (1999) 
argue that individuals' preferences for market versus non-market and for types of jobs 
such as manual work versus office work differ. 
Differences in individual preferences may result in group difference in preferences. 
Women and men as a group may prefer certain types of jobs with specific 
characteristics. The common believe, for instance, is that men may adopt a more 
ambitious approach towards wage work and married women a less ambitious attitude 
toward market work as a result of marital status (Graddy & Pistagerri, 2000). Hence, 
the allocation of preferences for specific job characteristics between groups, on the 
one hand, and the value to employers offering jobs with particular characteristics, on 
the other, will determine the occupational allocation and wage distribution for a 
particular group 1. This may lead to male-dominated (relatively high paid) and female-
dominated (low paid) occupations. 
It is true that differences in group preferences can explain at least some portion of 
gender-wage differences in the labour market as long as individual employees have 
different choices in market and non-wage work or in particular occupations. However, 
the whole discussion of differences in group preferences is all about the behaviours as 
regards choices of individual employees. The question remains: Why do individuals 
prefer non-market to market work or vice versa? In this case the causation effect is 











The sources of the gender-wage gap might be attributed to other factors, and not to 
differences in group preferences. The cause could be traced back to pre-market 
discrimination in child-rearing practices and in the educational system (Altonji & 
Blank, 1999) or it might be attributed to biological differences (since women and men 
are not the same physically). 
Although the above theory cannot explain the gender-wage differential adequately, it 
nonetheless suggests a potential explanation for the wage gap. 
2.5 Pre-labour Market Discrimination Theories 
According to McConnell and Brue (1989) pre-labour market discrimination is the 
same as human capital discrimination. They define it as the lack of equal opportunity 
to education and training or anything related to human capital investment. 
As identified by Ehrenberg and Smith (1985), there are three stages of investment in 
the knowledge and skills of a particular worker. The first stage is in early childhood 
when the individual does not decide for him or herself. The second is in adulthood 
when the individual decides for him or herself, and the third is in the place of work. 
The acquisition of human capital in early childhood is largely determined by the 
decisions of others (most of the time by parents). Therefore, according to pre-labour 
market theory, if pre-market discrimination is practised before the individual 
employee enters the labour market; it may affect the productivity and the wage of the 
worker. 
In the case of gender discrimination (unlike race) it is less likely that women would be 
discriminated against in enjoying equal access to government education. However, 
empirical studies prove that because of economic and socio-cultural factors, parents 











exercise pre-labour market discrimination. As indicated by Thomas (1990) recent 
studies outside the US have emphasised parental discrimination in favour of boys as 
the cause of the gender gap in human capital attainment. Moreover, Cain (1986) and 
Altonji and Blank (1999) suggest that if an educational difference between male and 
female is large, it may reflect societal discrimination (pre-labour market 
discrimination). 
This seems plausible in developing counties where a boy-child is often considered to 
be more valuable than a girl-child because of strong cultural factors. Eritrea is no 
exception. The implication of the pre-labour market discrimination theory for the 
male-female wage differential is that the human capital possessed by the group (say, 
women) may in itself encourage discrimination. Therefore, the source of the wage 
differential could be viewed as arising not from the acquisition of education at the 
second stage (adulthood when individuals decide for themselves) or third stage (after 
individuals have entered the labour market) but from discrimination practiced by 
parents before individual workers enter the labour market or the higher education 
system. 
The pre-labour market discrimination theory suggests one of the potential sources of 
the gender-wage gap but cannot adequately explain it. 
2.6 Employers' Behaviour and Labour Market Conditions 
Earlier sections discussed how differences in endowments (innate or acquired) and the 
behaviour of employees could be potential sources of the gender-wage gap. This 
section provides a discussion of how market conditions (market imperfection and 
segmented labour market) and the discriminatory behaviour of employers can be 











One could say that a certain group of employees is discriminated against when one 
group (female, in our case) has the same abilities, education, training and work 
experience as another group (male) but is treated unequally with respect to hiring, 
occupational access, promotion or wage rate (McConnell & Brue, 1989). The 
discriminatory behaviour of employers might take on different forms. According to 
Winter (1998) there are four types of discrimination in the labour market, that is 
employment, wage, on-the-job training and occupational access discriminations. 
Employment and wage discrimination are the most common type of discrimination 
exercised in the labour market. Employment or wage discrimination occurs when 
female employees who have equal or similar human capital and required skills do not 
enjoy equal access to employment or obtain lower wages than male employees 
because of their gender. 
On-the-job training discrimination occurs when females do not enjoy equal access to 
the training offered by employers in the workplace mainly because employers believe 
women are less attached to the market. The negative impact of this decision by 
employers might result in a low wages-experience profile for female employees. This 
is because women are protected from an investment (from learning by doing) that is 
expected to boost their productivity. 
Moreover, occupational discrimination exists when female employees are prohibited 
from entering certain occupations for economic reasons (i.e. employers may 
discriminate more informally when they consider interactions between women and 
men in the workplace adversely affect productivity), legal reasons (i.e. when labour 
laws prohibit shifts or night work) and cultural reasons (i.e. because society classifies 
male and female occupations). The negative impact of such decisions is over or 












2.6.1 Employers' Preference (Preference theory) 
Becker (1971) tries to explain how labour market discrimination arises from personal 
prejudice whereby employers dislike associating with workers of a given race or sex. 
Employers may feel comfortable or uncomfortable employing some specific groups in 
their work places. The implication of employer's preference on the gender-wage 
differential is that the prejudice may take the form of hatred associated of being with 
the group that they do not want to hire (in our case it may be with women). It may 
also manifest as a desire to help the group they like to work with (fellow men) 
whenever possible, or it may be motivated by considerations of rank and take the 
form of occupational segregation, thus shunting female workers to low-paying 
occupations while promoting male workers to the high-paying occupations. 
Therefore, preference or prejudice means that employers have to pay for their 
prejudice in terms of higher wages for such favoured workers. If the wages earned by 
women are less than those of men, the employer can maximize his profits by 
employing women only. If, however, the employer ignores the wage relativities and 
employs male workers, his profits will be lower. According to this model, non-
discriminatory employers will be at a competitive advantage because they can recruit 
equally productive workers from other groups (female) at a lower wage and gain in 
terms of profits. As a result of the competitive labour market, the wages of those 
lower-paid workers (female) ultimately will be driven up, implying that 
discrimination will be eliminated in the long term. 
This further implies gender discrimination only persists where there is some degree of 
imperfect competition. The major criticism of this theory lies in the statement that 
discrimination will, in the long run, disappear by itself in a competitive market. As 
indicated by McConnell and Brue (1989) and Faundz (1994), evidence in the USA 
does not show declining gender-wage discrimination. Despite the long-term 











highly unlikely that gender discrimination will be abolished by market forces without 
government intervention. 
2.6.2 Employers' Ignorance (Statistical discrimination theory) 
Employers' ignorance of important information about potential employees may cause 
the gender-wage differentiaL In their screening process, employers may use personal 
and group data when hiring employees. They consider all the personal qualifications 
and work experience of the individual, but they still hardly know about the 
productivity of the individual based on the personal data supplied by the prospective 
employees. For example, personal information like education is a weak predictor of 
productivity. Hence, employers use group characteristics such as gender when they 
are screening workers. This is referred to as the so-called screening problem. 
Hamermesh and Rees (1988) summarised employers' ignorance as follows: 
employers base their employment decision on the perception of reality. That is to say 
that an individual (female) employee is discriminated against because employers 
consider the group that individual (female) belongs to as less productive than another 
group (male). This does not mean that they have a taste for gender discrimination but, 
rather employers utilize group traits like race and sex because of the information 
asymmetry and because, unlike with proper screening of personnel, it is an 
inexpensive selection characteristic. 
The following example makes this argument clearer. If an employer is faced with two 
identically qualified and competent candidates, one male and the other female, he may 
take into account the likely costs of employment associated with each of them. On 
average, it ism ore I ikely that if he hires the woman, hew ill face maternity costs. 
Women are more likely to leave the labour force for child-rearing which will decrease 
their productivity. This selection criterion is used regardless of whether the individual 











for child-rearing) than the group as a whole. One member of the group is therefore 
discriminated against on the basis of belonging to that group, thereby reducing the 
demand for that particular group. Consequently, the wages will also be below the 
levels that would have been 0 ffered, had t hey been given equal treatment with the 
favoured group. 
The implication of the a bove theory to the gender-wage gap is that the greater the 
similarity between the relevant demographic groups, the less effective it becomes to 
apply group characteristics. Therefore, the gender-wage gap disappears gradually. 
1.6.3 Market Imperfection (Monopoly power) 
In the case of market imperfections, employers may use their power and offer 
different compensation levels to different groups of employees if they realise that it 
can be more profitable or minimises costs. Up until now firms were assumed to be 
prices-takers, but in the case of market imperfection firms have some degree of 
influence over the wages they pay. 
As pointed out by Barker (1999), where there are no competitive conditions the 
employer may apply a wage differential to equally productive groups of workers (for 
example, men and women) when they find it profitable. The employers will find it 
advantageous to pay lower wages to groups of workers whose labour supply is 
inelastic (i.e. less responsive to a wage reduction). This suggests that in a situation 
where there is high unemployment of some groups (women in this case), employers 
can be encouraged to pursue discriminatory policies against women. 
The implication of the model on gender-wage differentials is that differentials can be 
avoided or minimized by solving the unemployment problem through economic 











with relatively competitive labour markets, such as the US, still face compensating 
differences between male and female employees. 
2.6.4 Segmented Labour Market (The institutionalists' theories) 
Economists have for years attempted to determine which factors are more responsible 
for the large wage gap that exists between men's and women's wages in the labour 
market. The institutionalists present the notion of a Segmented Labour Market as a 
potential source of the gender-wage differential. Various types of Segmented Labour 
Market models exist (differing in the number of segments that characterise the market 
and the cause of the segmentation). 
The most recent and notable view suggested by some economists is the existence of a 
dual labour market. According to dualists, the labour market is divided into two non-
competing sectors: the primary sector (which pays relatively high wages, offers stable 
employment, has good working conditions, and has good opportunities for 
advancement) and the secondary sector (which offers relatively low wages, is 
unstable, offers few promotional opportunities and has poor working conditions). The 
returns to education and experience in the latter sector are considered to be 
insignificant (Ehrenberg & Smith, 2000). Furthermore, Dex (1985) also suggests that 
the primary sector itself is further classified into two sectors, the first of which covers 
the professional and managerial positions with favourable conditions a nd attractive 
wages, and the second of which is the less favourable sector. Dualists argue that 
motilities between sectors are limited. Workers demoted to the secondary sector are 
marked as unstable, unwanted workers, and are thought to have little hope of 
obtaining primary sector jobs. 
According to the dualist labour market theory, women have been historically 
employed in the secondary sector. They have, therefore, been exposed to 











order to fulfil their child-rearing responsibilities. The dualists argue that it is due to 
this unstable work history that women have not been able to break into the primary 
labour market. 
As a result, earnings become a function of segment, rather than of all the previously 
mentioned factors such as human capital investment choice, preferences and 
information asymmetry. The arguments of the intitutionalist have some validity, 
because, in the case of women, recent empirical evidence suggests that there are two 
distinct sectors of the labour market. The first is one in which education and 
experience is associated with higher wages. The second is one in which they are not, 
and women are more likely to be in the latter sector (Dickens & Lang, 1985). 
However, the intuitionalists do not really explain the initial cause of the concentration 
of women and minorities in specific segments, i.e. secondary sector jobs. Is this 
because of their preferences or because of some other constraints? 
2.7 Conclusions 
The supply-side theories suggest that the gender-wage gap can be explained by the 
differences in innate or acquired knowledge, skills of workers, and differences in 
group preferences. Individuals may join the labour market with different abilities that 
could give them easy access to high-paying jobs. Different preferences result in 
individuals taking low-paying jobs, and different human capital investment resulting 
from pre-labour market discrimination may prevent them from enjoying all the 
opportunities that the other group enjoys. Hence, the observed gender-wage 
differential is solely because the human resources rented out to the employer are 
different in quality. Conversely, the demand side theories suggest that the gender-
wage differential exists because of employers' preferences, lack of perfect 











However, no one theory is dominant in explaining the gender-wage gap. There is a bit 
of truth in all of them. In some countries, the labour market may be understood in 
terms of one theory over another, given the economy's particular configuration and 
that society's own history. 
In the case of Eritrea, because of the strong cultural factor which demands that 
women do the non-market job of child-rearing and take on other family 
responsibilities, and because of the incapability of employers to know the productivity 
of potential employees (information asymmetry) the pre-labour market discrimination 
theory and ignorance of employers (statistical discrimination theory) respectively 
could explain the gender-wage gap in the Eritrean labour market more than the 












DATA, METHODOLOGY AND VARIABLE SPECIFICATION 
3.1 Introduction 
In this section we will discuss methodological issues, variable specification and the 
nature of the data used for the analysis. Oaxaca-Blinder (1973) is the standard model 
used to measure the gender-wage differential. The same model will be applied in 
measuring the Eritrean gender-wage differential. Moreover, for a general overview of 
the data, a descriptive statistic analysis will be provided. The data used in the analysis 
is the Income and Expenditure Household Survey 1997. The data being the first in its 
kind there are no similar data sets for comparisons or cross-checking. Finally, all the 
variables included in the model and reasons for their inclusion will be presented. 
3.2 The Data 
The data used in this paper is drawn from the urban Eritrean Household Income and 
Expenditure Survey (EHIES) conducted by the National Statistics Office (now 
Statistics and Evaluation Office) of Eritrea and Fafo institute for Applied Social 
Science between August 1996 and October 1997. All members over the age of ten of 
each participating household were asked a series of detailed questions about their 
labour market activities as well as personal characteristics such as the level of 
education. The survey covered 5200 households (and over 76,000 individuals) of all 
ethnic groups in twelve urban centres in all the regions of the country. 
However, in analyzing the gender-wage differential in the labour market we confined 











earnings and full time workers2 who work in Asmara (the capital city), other highland 
towns (Adikeih, Nakfa, Mendefera, Decemhare, Keren, Ghinda), Western Lowland 
towns (Barentu, Agurdat, Tesseney), Massawa and Assab (Ports). After deleting the 
observations with missing values, the sample consists of 6033 observations out of 
which 4180 are men and the remaining 1853 women. The mean values of the 
explanatory variables of the wage model are given in table 13. 
3.3 Methodology 
Both descriptive statistics and econometric modelling will be part of the methodology 
in analysing wage differential and discrimination. Two models: the very simply 
Mincerian (1974) human capital earnings function and the Oaxaca-Blinder (1973) 
decomposition technique will be employed in measuring the gender-wage 
differentials and discrimination. 
3.2.1 Simple OLS Estimates 
The human capital earning function derived by Mincer (1974) can be summarized in 
the following wage equation: 
In W; = a + PiXi + Pi ........................................................................ (1) 
Where In W is the natural logarithm of the gross monthly wage for individual i; Xi is 
a vector representing the set of characteristics thought to be significant in the 
determination of individual earnings; Pi is the error term. 
2 The full-time workers are those who worked more than 35 hours per week. Workers with non-positive 
or unspecified wages and observations with missing data on any variable included in the earnings 











The wage equation is estimated using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression. The 
technique involves estimating the extent to which the disparity in the wage variable is 
associated with difference in the explanatory variables, which in this case are all the 
measurable variables. Keeping the effect of the others, the above technique enables 
the definition of the independent impact of each of the explanatory variables on the 
log of wages. 
This equation can be used to decompose the gender-wage differential. The above OLS 
model assumes the slope coefficients of explanatory variables are to be equal for both 
men and women. In other words, the model is a restricted model since only the 
intercept varies with gender, but the returns to all other variables are restricted to be 
equal for men and women. Of course one c an test these assumptions by running a 
Chow-test. 
3.2.1 Chow Test3 
In the post-entry labour market discrimination analyses running the Chow test as "the 
general approach is to take structural difference between male and female wage 
equations as a priori evidence of discrimination" (Chiplin & Sloane, 1976:733). 
Two separate regression functions (with the same variables) ought to be estimated, 
that is one for men and one for women. After estimating two separate functions it is 
necessary to test for structural change between the two functions. "The structural test 
may mean that the two intercepts are different, or the two slopes are different, or both 
the intercept and the slopes are different or any other suitable combination of the 
3 The assumptions underlying the Chow test are twofold: a) Jilt ~(O,52) and Ji21 ~(O,52)that 












parameters. Assuming that the two earnings functions are equivalent, the Chow test is 
then applied," (Gujarati, 1995:263). 
If the null hypothesis is rejected then this implies that the two functions are 
structurally different. This in turn implies that the earnings profiles of men and 
women are not homogenous. If it is otherwise, it implies that the two functions are the 
same, and further implies that we should not go further and decompose the two 
equations to investigate the sources of the gender-wage gap. Assuming the male and 
female wage equations are significantly different it is then possible to operationalize 
the standard Oaxaca-Blinder (1973) decomposition technique to measure the gender-
wage differentials and discrimination. 
3.2.3 Oaxaca - Blinder (1973) Decomposition 
The most widely used, and now standard, approach for the measurement of gender-
wage differences is the direct regression approach of Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder 
(1973). The Oaxaca-Blinder (1973) decomposition technique measures the gender-
wage differential and discrimination by separating the effects into two parts: the wage 
differential as a result of the measurable variables (such as human capital 
endowments) difference and another part that cannot be measured which is commonly 
taken to represent labour market discrimination. 
Basically, this frequently used model for measunng wage differentials and 
discrimination, assumes that where discrimination does not exist the estimated effect 
of male and female workers' endowments on wages are identical. Furthermore, 
differences are not only restricted to intercept terms through simple dummy variable 
specifications, but also include variations in estimated slope coefficients. 












1) Estimate wage regressions for the sample of men and a sample of women 
separately. 
In(wage),M =aM +flXiM +Jli
M 
........................................................ (2) 
In(wage)/ = a F + flX/ + Jl/ .......................................................... (3) 
Where F equals female and M equals male; the notation lnwage is the natural 
logarithm of gross monthly wages, Xi denotes an nxk dimensional matrix of 
observed characteristics known to affect wages ( education, experience, industry 
and occupation, type of employer, marital status, hours worked, etc), f3 is the k-
dimensional column vector of regression coefficients associated with the 
characteristics, and J1.i is a white-noise error term assumed to be normally 
distributed with variance (i. 
2) Taking the mean values of the independent variables and subtracting the second 
from the first equation gives: 
M F '" M M F '" F M F In(wage) -In(wage) = ~fl (X -X )+ ~X (fl -fl ) •..••..•.•..• (4) 
Or 
InCwage)M -In(wage)F = I flF (X M - XF) + I XM (flM - flF) .......... (5) 
The dependent variable 
The left-hand side of equations 4 and 5 represent the difference in log mean wages 
between male and female. The value on the left hand side is equated with the 
explained (the first term on the right-hand side of equations 4 and 5) and unexplained 
components (the second term in equations 4 and 5), which is commonly referred to as 











women therefore anse from either the difference in rewards to male and female 
characteristics ( Pm - P f ) or from the difference in the quantity of these endowments 
held by men and women employees (Xm -Xc). The wage differential caused by 
differences in endowment is normally called non-discriminator/ or justified 
discrimination. Whereas the difference in male and female coefficients is commonly 
known as unjustified discrimination and provides the upper (lower) bound estimate of 
discrimination.5 
These two equations explain the difference in the average wage of men and women 
that can arise because Pm > Pf and X m >Xf . Using either of the two equations stated 
above one can measure the gender-wage gap and the two sources of the gender-wage 
differential. The decomposition technique may be sensitive to the choice of index 
(standardizing according to male means or female means), ideally both 
decompositions should be carried out. Equation (4) is referred to as standardizing by 
female means while equation (5) is referred to as standardizing by male means6• 
The formulations in equations 4 and 5 correspond to Oaxaca's first and second 
assumptions, respectively. "In his empirical work he treated the issue as essentially an 
index number problem and obtained estimates from both formulations, using them to 
establish the range within which the true values of the components presumably would 
fall. Some subsequent research followed Oaxaca's example of estimating both forms 
of decomposition, while others opted for one form or the other, or some variant of 
'In this respect the Oaxaca-Blinder (1973) is trying to categorize the sources of the wage differential into two parts: the 
measurable variables (non-discriminatory) and unmeasurable variables (discrimination). But this doesn't mean that parents do 
not exercise pre-labour market discrimination. for religious cultural or other reasons. The standard model of Oaxaca-Blinder 
(1973), accommodate such kind of problems with some caution of interpreting the error term. 
lit will be an upper bound if there are omitted variables. Conversely, if the variables reflect discrimination. tor instance, if 
education reflects pre-labour market discrimination, it will be lower bound. Therefore, caution has to be taken when interpreting 
the error term. 
6 Oaxaca explained these alternative forms of the decomposition in the following manner: On the basis of either of two 
assumptions, we can estimate the Male-female wage ratio that would exist in the absence of discrimination: if there were no 
discrimination, I) the wage structure currently faced by female would also apply to males, 2) the wage structure currently faced 
by males would also apply to women. Assumption one (two) says that women (Males) would on average receive in the absence 
of discrimination of same wages as they presently receive. but that discrimination takes the form of males (female) receiving 











both" (Cotton, 1998:237). In this study, we employ both equations to estimate the 
range within which the true values of the components presumably would faI17. 
The dependent variable can be estimated in two ways. The mean log monthly wage of 
men and mean log monthly wage of women can be separately estimated, and the 
mean log monthly wage of women can be deducted from the mean log monthly wage 
of women to get the gender-wage gap (this is the same like subtracting the geometric 
means of men and women). Or, using the decomposition technique, the values for the 
two components (i.e. the difference in endowment and discrimination) can be 
estimated and summed up to get the dependent variable. 
The explained component 
This simply states that the coefficient of male multiplied by mean characters of male 
minus coefficients of male multiplied by mean characters of female. In other words, 
one has to multiply each mean explanatory variable of female by the respected male 
coefficient and deduct from the mean explanatory variables of male weighted by each 
respected male coefficient. The summation of it will measure the explained 
component of equation 4. This is the same as plugging in the average values of the 
female characteristics into the male equation to estimate the female earnings In 
equation 4. Likewise, the explained component can be measured using (5). 
1 In this case, it doesn't mean that the index number problem can generally be resolved by looking simply at the range of 
estimates when changing the benchmark from male to female. It is difficult to say so. That is because there is no guarantee that 
the appropriate counterfactual for the return structures for men and women would lie anywhere in the range. The non-
discriminatory return structures for both groups are of course dependent on the preferences of men and women for market versus 
non-market labour, and without knowing more about this, it is hard to say that a common return structure would lie somewhere in 











The unexplained component 
The unexplained component can be estimated in two ways. One is to directly estimate 
discrimination by differencing the female coefficients from the male coefficients and 
weight by the female characteristic values of the female if equation 4 is used. If 
equation 5 is employed, the male characteristics are multiplied by the difference of the 
male and female coefficients. Or discrimination can be indirectly estimated by first 
estimating the dependent variable (by differencing the mean log wage of male and the 
mean log wage of female) and the explained component and deducting the explained 
component from the dependent variable. Estimating discrimination using the two 
different approaches might be different. 
3.4 Variable Specification 
Before one commences measuring the gender-wage differential and discrimination 
using Oaxaca-Blinder (1973), for unbiased estimation the following questions need to 
be answered: what variables could cause the variation in the dependent variable? And 
what variables are available in the data? Therefore, here below, we present the 
specification of the dependent and independent variables included in the model. 
Dependent variable 
The dependent variable is the worker's gross monthly wage or salary. This includes 













The reward for education in the labour market varies across the educational ladder. 
Therefore, to capture the influence 0 f education, a sac ontinuous variable but with 
different slopes, on the gender-wage differential three educational splines are 
incorporated in the model. The three educational splines included are for those who 
have no education and completed primary education (edulev I), completed secondary 
education (edulev2) and completed tertiary education (edulev3). Signs of the 
coefficients of the three educational splines are expected to be positive implying 
higher education higher wages. 
Experience 
Wages differ with differences in work experience (Mincer, 1994). Since actual labour 
market experience is not available, potential experience is used as a proxy8. Hence to 
capture the male-female wage differential that may arise because of differences in 
experience of work potential experience is included in the model. Wage is positively 
related with work experience. Thus a positive sign is expected. 
Experience squared 
A squared term for expenence IS included to allow for the possibility that 
experience's influence on wages is non-linear. This is to demonstrate that returns to 
experience are positive and decline with increase in experience peaking somewhere 
on the average working life. If the earnings function is concave in experience, as is 











suggested by human capital theory, then the expected Sign of the coefficient IS 
negative. 
Erichen and Wakeford (2001) warned that if one uses potential experience as a proxy 
for actual experience might inflate the quantity of experience. This is because it 
implicitly assumes t hat all workers begin elementary sc hool a t age six and that no 
time is spent outside the labour force or school. Note in particular that for females the 
temporary withdrawal of women from the labour market is not captured. 
Hours worked per week 
The dependent variable in our analyses is gross monthly wage. So long as the 
dependent variable is monthly wage, hours of work need to be included to capture the 
gender-wage differential as a result of variation in hours worked. Wage and hours 
worked are positively related and the expected sign of the coefficient is positive. 
Marital Status 
Marital status of individuals has an impact on their wages. For instance, married men 
have a responsibility to feed for the family and this push them to either work hard in 
their current occupation or search for a better paying job. Alternatively, a common 
belief is that married men may take on a more ambitious attitude toward work and 
married women a less ambitious attitude toward work as a result of marital status 
(Grady & Pistagerri, 2000). On the other hand, however, married women may be 
more likely to work because they are able to save money for investment through their 
husbands to open small enterprises or use their husband's connections to find wage 
employment (Glick & Sahn, 1997). 
Hence marital status can either negatively affect an individual's wage especially in the 











there to compliment their husbands' income, or positively if marriage offers an 
opportunity of getting a job or power to invest. Therefore four marital status 
dummies: married (maril), widowed (mari2), divorced (mari3) and never married 
(mari4) are included in the analyses to capture the impact of marital status in the 
gender-wage differential. Married is the referent variable. We expect an ambiguous 
relationship between marital status and wages. 
Industry 
The industry in which an individual is employed also has an effect on their wage. This 
is because the demand for skilled and unskilled labour differs between the industries 
depending upon the nature of production. The skilled- unskilled ratio might be higher 
for the tertiary sector compared to secondary and primary sectors, i.e. the demand for 
skilled might be higher in the tertiary (such as financial and business service sectors) 
compared to secondary (such as manufacturing) and primary sectors (such as 
agriculture and mining). Hence the unequal distribution of skill between the sectors 
might result in a wage differential between male and female employees. Moreover, 
wages for individuals with the same skills and occupations can vary depending upon 
the risk linked a sector. For instance, a manager from the mining industry can earn 
more than a manager in the public sector because the one from the mining sector has a 
high-risk premium, so he or she is rewarded by a higher wage. Hence, to capture the 
sectoral gender-wage gap sixteen industrial dummies were considered in the analyses 
and these are Agriculture (indl), Fishing (ind2), Mining (ind3), Manufacturing (ind4), 
Energy and Water (ind5), Construction (ind6), Trade (ind7), Hotels and restaurant 
(ind8), Transport and communication (ind9), Finance and Real estate (indIO) Public 
administration (ind11) Education (indI2) Health and Social work (ind13), Other 
service activities (ind 14), Private households (ind 15), and Extra-territorial 
organization (indI6). The signs of the coefficients are expected to be ambiguous. 












The occupational distribution of men and women across the occupations are different. 
As indicated by empirical evidences women are over-represented in the so-called 
female dominated occupations and men are over-represented in the male-dominated 
occupations. 0 ne 0 f t he main reasons for the m ale-female wage differential is that 
those 0 ccupations t hat are disproportionately filled by women tend to be relatively 
low-paying occupations while male-dominated occupations tend to offer high wages. 
Hence, to capture the differential as a result of being working in different occupations 
we incorporated eleven occupational dummies and theses are Professional & technical 
(occpl), Administrative & managerial (occp2), Government & executive official 
(occp3), Clerical works (occp4), Sales workers (occp5), Service workers (occp6), 
Military (occp7), Agriculture & Fishing (occp8), Production related (occp9), and 
Transport equipment operators (occplO). The referent variable is daily labourers. The 
signs of the coefficients are ambiguous. 
Employer 
Wage differs with the type of employer. The self-employed, for instance, earn less 
than those employees in the governmental and public sector. Thus, in the wage 
estimation process four employer dummies were included to capture the difference 
that may be elicited from being employed in different employers. These are 
Government (empll), Private (empI2), Public (empI3) and self-employment (empI4). 













Wage levels may also vary with ethnicity. This could be when belonging to one group 
opens more access to different variables important in the wage determination process 
or when belonging to one ethnic releases opportunity to employment or promotion. 
To capture the wage differential that may arise as a result of belonging to one ethnic 
group, we incorporated in our model nine ethnic dummies. These are Afar (ethnl), 
Billen (ethn2), Hedarb (ethn3), Kunama (ethn4), Nara (ethn4), Rashaida (ethnS), Saho 
(ethn7), Tigre (ethn8) and Tigrigna (ethn9). The base variable is specified to be 
Tigrinya ethnic group and the expected sign is ambiguous. 
Place of work 
Wage differs with the place of work. This is because in one place there might be more 
employment and overtime work, while in other places of work the demand for labour 
may be low. Or, because of harsh working conditions, wages might be high in some 
places and low in others. Hence, to capture the wage differential that could be 
demonstrated as working in different places we integrated twelve town dummies; 
namely, Adekeyih (townl), Akurdet (town2), Assab (town4), Barentu (townS), 
Decemhare (town6), Ghinda (town7), Keren (town8), Massawa (town9), Menderfera 
(townlO), Nakfa (townll), and Tseney (townl2). The base variable is specified to be 
Asmara. The sign of the coefficients of the dummy variables are ambiguous. 
Fighter 
The variable 'fighter' is included in the analyses to represent whether an individual 
employees has participated in the liberation struggle or not. This is because the wage 
determination process for those employees who participated in the liberation struggle 











employees who participated in the struggle for liberation non-economic factors (a sort 
of affirmative action) are considered. 
Generally the employees who participated in the liberation struggle earn more than 
those employees who didn't participate in it. This is consistent for both male and 
female workers. However, the proportion of male employees who participated in the 
army struggle for liberation is significantly higher than for female employees (in the 
sample 18% and 13% of the sample labour force are male and female fighters 
respectively). Hence, in the analyses of gender-wage gap, some portion of the 
differential is expected to be explained by whether one belongs to the fighter group or 
not. Therefore, the impact of wage differential that arise as a result of belonging the 
fighter group or not is capture by a dummy variable defined as; 1 if one belongs to 
that group and zero otherwise. The sign of the coefficient of male is expected to be 
positive. 
Finally, job tenure, union membership, quality of education, educational level of 
parents, children less than six and ability might influence wage earnings. However, 
information was not available in the income and expenditure household survey 1997. 
3.5 Specification Test 
After specifying the variables that cause the gender-wage differential and dealing with 
the expected sings on the various explanatory variables, it is necessary to run the 
specification test. The problem with most models is an over-reliance on assumptions 
that rarely hold true. The solution to the problem is undergoing the required test. 












Basically, the estimation technique commences by including all the measurable and 
available potential sources of the gender-wage gap in the model. However, it is 
possible for three reasons that some differences would remain 'unexplained' even if 
all the measurable factors were incorporated. Firstly, some variables cannot be 
observed or measured by the researcher. Secondly, the existing variables are 
inaccurately or poorly measured in the estimation. Alternatively the unexplained 
differential could be interpreted as resulting from discriminatory treatment in the 
labour market. 
Moreover, to investigate the causes of gender-wage differences is simply to employ a 
human capital approach and estimate the wage equation using the Ordinary Least 
Square COLS) regression. In coming up with the measure of discrimination first, 
estimate three wage equations, which included a pooled one for both men and women 
and two others for men and women, respectively. Then apply the conventional 
Oaxaca-Blinder (1973) decomposition technique to decompose the differences as 












DESCRIPTIVE AND ECONOMETRIC 
ANALYSES 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides descriptive statistics, giving a general overview of the data on 
the wage differential between men and women. However, since we could not measure 
each variable's contribution to the wage differential using descriptive statistics, we go 
further to model the earnings function of both male and female employees and 
measure the wage gap which could be attributed to an 'explained' (also commonly 
known as human capital investment) component and to an 
(discrimination) part. 
4. 2 Wage Differential: Descriptive Statistics 
'unexplained' 
In 1997, the mean monthly gross wages of women was Nacfa 376, or 61 % of men's 
average monthly gross wage, Nacfa 615.9 The wage gap, as one can imagine, can be 
attributed both to differences in human capital investment and unequal treatment in 
the labour market. In order to better understand the causes of the wage gap it is 
necessary to analyse the distribution of the endowments between the groups and how 
the two groups are distributed in the major occupational classifications, sectors etc. In 
addition, it is necessary to analyse the wage distribution across all variables included 
in the model. For a general overview of the male-female wage gap at different level of 
income, a presentation of wage distribution by percentile will be helpful. 











Wage distribution by percentile 
A percentile wage distribution shows what percentages of workers in an occupation 
earn less than a given wage a nd what percentages earn more. Table 1 p resents the 
wage distribution by percentile level and gender. 
Table 1: Percentiles of gross monthly wages by gender 
%Of 
Percentile Male Female National Log(Mp-Fp) male 
10% 202.78 121.67 152.08 1.91 60.00 
50"10 506.94 283.89 446.11 2.35 56.00 
75% 811.11 456.25 709.72 2.55 56.25 
90"10 1115.28 811.11 1049.38 2.48 72.73 
As revealed from table 1 above, 10 % of all the employees earn less than Nacfa 152 
and the remaining 90 % earn more than Nacfa 152 per month. However this figure 
differs when disintegrated by gender. Male and female employees in the loth 
percentile earned Nacfa 203 and Nacfa 122 per month respectively. Women earned 60 
% (or Nacfa 81 less than men) of what men earned in 1997. 
Moreover, 50 % of all the employees earned Nacfa 446 per month. Both male and 
female employees in the 50th percentile earned Nacfa 507,284 per month respectively. 
Women in the 50th percentile earned 56 % of what men earned (Nacfa 233 lower than 
men) in 1997. 
Furthermore, 75 % of the total employees earned less than Nacfa 710 and the 
remaining 25 % earned more than Nacfa 710 per month. Men and women in the 75th 
earned Nacfa 811 and Nacfa 456 respectively per month. Women in the 75th 











In addition, 90 % of the employees earned less than Nacfa 1049 and 10 % earned 
more than Nacfa 1049 per month. Male and female employees in the 90th percentile 
earned Nacfa 1115 and Nacfa 811 respectively per month. Women in the 90th 
percentile earned about 73 % or Nacfa 304 lower than what men earned. 
Clearly the largest gender-wage gap was indicated for those workers in the 75 th 
percentile compared to the other percentiles. The median gender-wage gap (56 %) 
was larger compared to the mean gender-wage gap (61 %). 
Education 
The mean years of education in the sample is 7.46, the average male and female 
schooling are 7.95 and 6.41 respectively. Male employees had about a year and a half 
more years of schooling than female employees. As indicated in chapter three, 
workers' labour market outcomes are affected by the amount and kind of education 
they acquire, and so is the condition with both male and female Eritrean workers. 
Table 2: Gross mean monthly wages by educational level & gender 
"IoOf 
Level of education Male Female Average male 
No formal education 384.01 206.71 310.69 53.83 
Primary & Junior education 549.01 273.26 473.2 49.77 
Secondary education 630.53 486.22 587.31 77.11 
Tertiary education 928.06 755.62 898.54 81.42 
Average 615.15 376.14 541.78 61.15 
As indicated in table 2 above, both male and female workers' wages are positively 
related to education as expected. That is to say, across the educational hierarchy 
wages increase for both male and female workers simultaneously. However, even 
though wages of both male and female employees are positively related to educational 
level, women earn less than men across all the educational levels. The wage gap is 











what men earn. Conversely, the gap is minimum at tertiary education level at about 82 
%. 
Furthermore, the mean gross monthly wage of men with no formal education is higher 
than those women who possess primary and junior education. Again men with 
primary and junior education e am more than those female employees who possess 
secondary education. 
The two samples of educational means of the two groups are significantly different lO• 
As suggested by Altonji and Blank (1999), if educational differences between genders 
are large it may reflect different preferences and choices, and/or they may reflect pre-
market discrimination. 
Experience 
The mean year of experience for the whole sample is 22.93 years while it is 23.84 and 
20.87 for men and women respectively. Male workers, on average, have three years of 
experience (14 %) more than female workers. Mean wages, as is indicated in table 3 
(except for the first five years) first increases at a decreasing rate then decreases with 
respect to experience. In other words, as individuals get older their earnings actually 
fall. This complies with the explanation of the wage-experience profile of human 
capital theory. 
10 A mean test is run to determine whether the sample educational means of the two groups are the same or not. The null 
hypothesis was rejec(d (Z=5.28935 and 22.0310 at I % level for both education and experience respectively) implying that the 











Table 3: Mean gross monthly wages by gender and years of experience 
Yrs ofexp Male Female Average %ofMale 
0- 5 624.94 427.09 526.01 68.34 
5-10 572.69 421.39 497.04 73.58 
10-15 615.15 500.02 557.59 81.28 
15-20 2009.01 1528.92 1768.97 76.1 
20-25 758.58 351.41 554.99 46.32 
25-30 657.62 284.1 470.86 43.2 
30-35 675.61 269.43 472.52 39.88 
40+ 445.29 194.6 319.94 43.7 
Average 615.15 376.14 541.78 61.15 
Hours worked ll 
The sample mean of weekly hours worked was 47 hours. The mean for men and 
women's average weekly hours worked were 49 and 45 respectively. The mean value 
of weekly hours worked by men is higher than the sample mean and women's mean 
value as welL This implies that male employees work longer hours per a week. 
Industry 
Overall, 10.63 % of employed women worked in the other service activities sector 
compared with 3.85 % 0 f men. Likewise, 19.56 % and 14.61 % of employed men 
worked in the transport and communication and construction sectors respectively 











Table 4: Percentage distribution of employment by industrial groups & gender 
Sex 
Sector Male Female Average 
Agriculture 3.85 4.32 3.99 
Fishing 1.65 0.43 1.28 
Mining 2.06 0.92 1.71 
Manufacturing 15.35 14.68 15.14 
Energy and water 4.26 1.67 3.46 
Construction 14.61 2.81 10.98 
Trade 5.4 3.4 4.79 
Hotels and restaurant 1.82 9.61 4.21 
Transport and communication 19.56 8.8 16.25 
Finance and real estate 3.9 4.16 3.98 
Public administration 14.99 17.38 15.72 
Education 5.26 6.21 5.55 
Health and social works 2.58 11.28 5.25 
Other service activities 3.85 10.63 5.93 
Private households 0.17 3.02 1.04 
Extra-territorial organization 0.72 0.7 0.71 
Total in percent 100 100 100 
One can easily observe in table 4 above that the largest employer of men is the 
transport and communications sector. Manufacturing, public administration and 
construction were also major industries employing men. Almost 65 % of men were 
employed in these four industries. The major employer of women was public 
administration, which employs about 17.38 % of the entire female labour force. 
Manufacturing and health & social work were also important female-employing 
industries. That is, almost half of all women were employed in these three sectors. 
At the time of the survey, the transport and communication, construction, 
manufacturing and public administration were highly dominated by men, whereas 
women were over-represented in public administration, manufacturing (most probably 
in the textile factories) health and social work. 
11 Individuals that do not work are treated like they have zero hours of earnings and zero wages. Two earning functions of the 
entire sample have been estimated using the Tobit and OLS estimators. The estimation were exactly the same implying the 
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Table 5 above reveals that mmmg, finance & real estate, and transport & 
communication sectors yield the highest mean wages consecutively. Hotels & 
restaurant, agriculture, private household and other service activities sectors, on the 
contrary, yield the lowest mean wages respectively. After analysing employment 
distribution across the industrial group and wages earned we discovered that 27.58 % 
of all women employed were working in the sectors with low payment compared to 
only 9.69 % men. On top of this, 26.24 % of the overall employed men were working 
in the sectors which offer high payment compared with only 14.58 % women. 
Table 5 above also presents the gross mean monthly wage of men and women within 
each sector. In all sectors male employees earned more than female ones. The gender-
wage gap is high in mining, fishing and manufacturing industries where women 
earned only 43 %,45 % and 47 % of what men earned in 1997. On the other hand the 
wage gap is narrow in the private household, education and transport and 












As shown in tables 6 and 7, comparisons of the different distributions of women and 
men employees and mean wages across 11 broad occupational categories are 
provided. 
Table 6: Distribution of employment by occupation and gender 
OCcupations Male Female Average 
Professional & technical 11.26 13.71 12.01 
Administrative & managerial 5.07 2.16 4.17 
Government & executive 1.03 0.16 0.76 
Clerical workers 11.64 22.67 15.03 
Sales workers 1.94 2.05 1.97 
Service workers 9.16 37.18 17.76 
Military 0.86 0.22 0.66 
Agriculture1 fishing 5.21 5.67 5.35 
Production and relate 39.28 15.76 32.06 
Transport equipment 0 8.77 0.16 6.13 
Daily labourers 5.79 0.27 4.09 
Total in percent 100 100 100 
From the 11 occupational groups shown above, those showing the greatest 
concentrations of men were production and related occupations with 39.28 % of the 
employed men in the labour force whereas 37.18 % of the employed women were 
contracted on service works occupation. Moreover, 38.43 % of the overall employed 
women in the labour force are confined to clerical and production & related works. 
Overall of the labour force, about 30 % of the employed men worked in the clerical, 
professional & technical occupations. In other words, 75.61 % of the employed 
women were concentrated only in service, clerical and production and related works. 
Similarly, 62.18 % of the employed men in the labour force were over-represented in 











Table 7: Gross mean monthly wages by occupation 
%Of 
occupation Male Female Average male 
Military 751 663 720.06 88.39 
Administrative & managerial 1118 834 1073.35 74.58 
Govern & executive official 910 661 893.53 72.67 
Professional & technical 645 515 584.98 79.83 
Transport equip operators 387 277 351.81 71.73 
Daily labourers 354 200 255.11 56.61 
Clerical works 1133 672 1086.71 59.29 
Production & related 351 313 338.85 89.2 
Sales works 590 300 545.87 50.85 
Agriculture/fishing 625 383 623.4 61.16 
Service works 607 789 610.47 130.03 
Average 615.15 376.14 541.78 61.15 
As displayed in table 7, the clerical, administrative & managerial and government & 
executive occupational groups yield the highest mean wages consecutively. 
Employment distribution across the occupational group and wages earned we 
discovered that 24.89 % of all women employed were working in the occupations 
with high payment compared to only 17.74% men. However, the employed women 
who belong to these occupational groups are paid 59.29%, 74.58% and 72.67 % of 
their men counterparts. 
On the other hand, daily labourers, production & related, and transport equipment 
operators are the least-paying occupational groups consecutively. The employment 
distribution of men and women, on average, across the above mentioned occupational 
groups are 53.84 % and 16.19 % consecutively. The employed women who belong to 
these occupational groups earned 56.61 %,89.2% and 71.73% of what men earned. 
Moreover, 75 % of all the employed women and about 60% of all the employed men 
were concentrated on the so-called female dominated occupational groups; namely, 
service, clerical and production and related works. Women workers in the above 











Generally, working in predominantly female 0 ccupations lowers the wages 0 fb oth 
female and male workers, but women in such occupations on average earn even less 
than their male counterparts. Women (except in one occupational group) were paid 
substantially less than their men counterpart employees within each occupational 
category. The finding, however doesn't confirm that segregation contributes to 
women's lower wages. 
Employer 
Table 8 below shows that the largest employer of both women and men IS the 
government (42.93 %) followed by the private sector (34.06 %). 
Table 8: Percentage distribution of employment by employer 
Employer Male Female Average 
Private 35.17 31.57 34.06 
Government 39.56 50.51 42.93 
Public 21.09 13.6 18.79 
Self-employed 4.18 4.32 4.22 
Total in percent 100 100 100 
Despite the fact that a significant share of the employed women work for the 
government (50.51 %) which pays the highest wages compared to other sectors, 
women workers were paid substantially less than men by each type of employer. As it 
can be observed from table 9 below, the wage gap is higher in the self-employed 
sector followed by the private sector compared to the public and government 
sectors 12. The economic reason could be that the public and government sectors are 
insulated from competition, and are more likely to adopt a less discriminatory hiring 
and wage system than the private sector. 
I) Government a nd public sector in the E ritrean e ontext are different. Government sector is a sector, which i neludes a II the 
government ministries that are usually administered by government budget. Whereas the public sector are different from the 











Table 9: Gross mean monthly wages by employer 
Employer Male Female Average -/oOf Male 
Private 539 264.65 460.94 49.1 
Govemment 681.53 458.8 601.07 67.32 
Public 645.59 375.34 585.54 58.14 
Self-employed 474.12 226.75 396.51 47.83 
Average 615.15 376.14 541.78 61.15 
Marital status 
As depicted in table 10, married employees followed by employees who were never 
married earned more than widowed or divorced employees. However, if the mean 
wages are further classified according to marital status and gender, interesting 
findings may be observed. Divorced men earned higher than the married, never 
married and widowed. The economic reason might be the increased responsibility a 
divorced Eritrean man has for the cost of living of his child. 
Table 10: Mean wages by maritual status and gender 
Marital Status Average Male Female %OfMale 
Married 622 649 508 78.27 
Widowed 275 435 241 55.29 
Divorced 358 658 284 43.18 
Never married 488 542 352 64.93 
Average 542 615 376 61.15 
Conversely, the fact that married women, on average, earned more than the never 
married, widowed and divorced might be attributed to married women getting the 
highest employment opportunity (35.77 %), as compared to those never married 
(26.11 %), divorced (24.66 %), and widowed (13.44 %). The economic reason could 
be that married women may be more likely to work because they are able to secure 
capital through their husbands to start up small enterprises or use their husbands' 











each category. However, the gap is higher for widowed (55.4 %) and divorced (43.16 
%) employees. 
The fact that about 66 % of the employed men are married compared to about 36 % 
women, as shown in table 11 below, supports the common presumption that married 
men maya dopt a m ore ambitious attitude toward work and married women a 1 ess 
ambitious attitude toward work as a result of marital status. 
Table 11: percentage distribution of employment by gender 
Marital status Male Female Average 
Married 66.46 35.78 57.04 
Widowed 1.27 13.44 5.00 
Divorced 2.70 24.66 9.44 
Never married 29.57 26.12 28.51 
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Fighters 
As revealed in table 12, non-fighter employees, on average, earned about 66 % of 
what fighter employees earned in 1997. Although the mean wage gap between men 
and women employees of the non-fighters was higher, women fighters still earned 
less than their men fighter counterparts. The proportion of male fighter employees 
(18.04 %) is higher compared to only 13 % women fighter employees. If the 
percentage distribution of men and women fighter workers is taken into account, the 
fighter variable contributes significantly to the gender-wage differential. 
The mean gross monthly wage for the non-fighters (Nacfa 504.37) was 65.64 % of 
what the fighters (Nacfa 768.42) earned. About 62 % of the workers are employed by 
the government and the public sectors. These are the two sectors expected to employ 
fighters. In the wage determination of fighters a form of affirmative action is 











and experience. In the case of fighters the experience referred to is the years spent in 
the struggle for independence. Therefore, it is possible to say that the mean gross 
monthly wage for fighters was higher because of non-economic factors (pay-back for 
fighting in the war) which were considered. As the proportion of male fighters is 38 % 
higher than that of female fighters, the fighter variable contributes to the wage gap as 
a group. 
Table 12: Gross mean monthly wages by fighters and non-fighters and gender 
% Distribution Mean wages 
Fighter Male Female Male Female Average %Ofmale 
Non-fighters 81.96 86.89 585.52 332.15 504.37 56.73 
Fighters 18.04 13.11 798.82 655.91 768.42 82.11 
Total 100 100 615.15 376.14 541.78 61.15 
Ethnicity and place of work 
As shown in appendix 2A, male employees belonging to Afar, Rashaida and Tignigna 
ethnic groups earned 60.69 %, 11.69 %, and 9.59 % higher than the average group 
monthly wage. Conversely, workers who belong to the other ethnic groups earned less 
than the mean monthly wage. Female employees who belong to Afar, Tigre, Billen 
and Saho ethnic groups earned 57.98 %, 18.51 %, 5.65 %, and 4.2 % higher than the 
mean gross monthly wages respectively and the remaining female employees 
belonging to the other ethnic group earned less than group mean monthly wages. 
Moreover women across all the ethnic groups earned less than what men earned in 
1997. The mean wage gap in the Tigre ethnic group was very small, i.e. women 
earned 99.37 % of what men earned during the survey. Female employees who belong 
to the Tigrigna ethnic group earned 54.35 % of what male ones earned, signalling the 











As shown in appendix 2B, Assab (port), Asmara (the capital city) and Massawa 
(another port), were, respectively, t he first, second and the third towns in t errns 0 f 
high wage-earnings. Male employees who worked in the above-mentioned towns 
earned wages 32.15 %, 9.2 %, and 7.56 % higher than the mean group gross monthly 
wages. Whereas the remaining employees who work in the other towns, on average, 
earned less than the group mean gross monthly wage. Women who worked in Nakfa 
(17.02 %), Assab (13.59 %), Asmara (6.91 %) and Decemhare (2.21 %) earned higher 
than the group mean gross monthly wage. Employees who worked in the other towns, 
however, earned less than the group mean gross monthly wage in 1997. Except, in 
Nakfa where female earned 10.56 % higher than male, female employees earned less 
than their male counterparts in all the other towns. 
Table 13:The mean value of male, female and male & female 
Variables Code M·Female Male Female 
Log Gross Monthly wage In wage 6.038976 6.207503 5.6585386 
Elementary &Junior education edulevl 5.280649 5.52546 4.7280086 
Secondary education edulev2 1.427601 1.481712 1.3054506 
Tertiary education edulev3 0.8020212 0.94645 0.47598489 
P.work Experience exper 22.93058 23.8415 20.874258 
P.work Experience Squared exper2 735.5456 792.6017 606.74582 
Adekeyih town 1 0.0205434 0.018169 0.02590394 
Akurdet town2 0.0468854 0.051399 0.03669725 
Assab town4 0.1452949 0.157542 0.11764706 
Barentu town5 0.0349569 0.030361 0.04533189 
Decernhare town6 0.0289927 0.027253 0.03291959 
Ghinda town7 0.0289927 0.037055 0.01079331 
Keren town8 0.0667661 0.070045 0.05936319 
Massawa town9 0.2064281 0.216352 0.1840259 
Mendefera town 10 0.0420808 0.034425 0.05936319 
Nakfa*** town 11 0.0112657 0.010041 0.0140313 
Teseney*** town12 0.0755467 0.076022 0.07447383 
Professional & technical occpl 0.1201127 0.112599 0.13707501 
Administrative & managerial occp2 0.0417495 0.050681 0.02158662 
Government &executive official*** occp3 0.0076209 0.01028 0.001619 
Clerical works occp4 0.1502651 0.116424 0.22665947 
Sales workers"* occp5 0.019715 0.019364 0.02050729 
Service workers occp6 0.1776011 0.091561 0.37182947 
Military*** occp7 0.0066269 0.008606 0.00215866 
Agriculture/fishing* * * occp8 0.0535123 0.052116 0.05666487 











Transport equipment operators occpl0 0.0612989 0.087736 0.001619 
Afar ethnl 0.0208748 0.026536 0.00809498 
Billen ethn2 0.018224 0.021994 0.00971398 
Hedarb*** ethn3 0.0008284 0.001195 0 
Kunama ethn4 0.0188867 0.014583 0.02860227 
Nara ethn5 0.0235255 0.021994 0.02698327 
Rashiada*** ethn6 0.0003313 0.000478 0 
Saho ethn7 0.0243539 0.030122 O.ot133297 
Tigre ethn8 0.1133201 0.143916 0.04425256 
Fishing ind2 0.0127568 0.016495 0.00431732 
Mining ind3 O.ot70643 0.020559 0.00917431 
Manufacturing ind4 0.1514248 0.153478 0.14678899 
Energy and water ind5 0.0346256 0.042553 0.01672963 
Construction ind6 0.109841 0.146067 0.0280626 
Trade ind7 0.0478794 0.054028 0.03399892 
Hotels and restaurant ind8 0.0420808 0.018169 0.09606044 
Transport &communication ind9 0.1625249 0.195553 0.08796546 
Finance & real estate*"'* indIO 0.0397614 0.038967 0.04155424 
Public administration indll 0.1572233 0.149892 0.17377226 
Education ind12 0.0555003 0.052594 0.06206152 
Health and social work ind13 0.0525182 0.025819 0.11279007 
Other service activities ind14 0.0593108 0.038489 0.10631409 
Private households ind15 0.0104374 0.001673 0.03022126 
Extra territorial organization ind16 0.0071239 0.007172 0.00701565 
Private employee empll 0.3406229 0.351661 0.31570426 
Public employee emp13 0.1878728 0.210853 0.13599568 
Self-employed*'" * empl4 0.0422465 0.041836 0.04317323 
Hours worked per week fU2bq13 47.52684 48.69448 44.890988 
Widowed mari2 0.0500331 0.01267 0.13437669 
Divorced mari3 0.0944334 0.027014 0.24662709 
Never married mari4 0.2851226 0.295721 0.26119806 
Fighter Fighter 0.1652577 0.180383 0.13113869 
Sam~le Size 6033 4180 1853 
A mean lest is run to determine whether the sample means of the two groups are the same or not. The sample means of the 
variables with *u are found to be the same whereas the sample means without the *** are found to be statistically significantly 
different 13 at 5% level. 
13 The null hypothesis which says the sample means of the two group are the same is rejected in lavour of the alternative 
hypothesis which says the sample means of the two group are not the same if 
x-y Z - - S -;;========= > a • where X = the sample mean of male and y = the sample mean of female; x 
~(s/ InJ+(s/ Iny) 
Standard error for males and S y = Standard error for females; n x male sample size and n y female sample size, The 
above approximation is generally satisfactory when each sample contains at least thirty observations. Then to a good 
approximation. tests of significance level a for the difference between population means are obtained by replacing the 
2 2 











In concluding the descriptive statistical analysis, given the lower education level, 
experience, and hours of work per week for women and subsequent employment of 
women in low-skilled sectors, low paying occupations, it is not surprising that these 
women on average earned less than men in Eritrea. This does not mean that there is 
no unequal treatment of both sexes in the labour market. The fact that female 
employees are disproportionately represented in some specific 0 ccupations indicate 
some form of occupational discrimination (Barker, 1999) and the wide mean wages 
gap between men and women suggests gender-wage discrimination in the labour 
market. 
Descriptive statistics cannot be used to effectively account for the simultaneous 
contribution of each of the variables to explain and measure the extent of the gender-
wage differential. Therefore, it is necessary to employ earnings function to separately 
understand the input of each variable in the model to the gender-wage gap and to 
measure the extent of the wage gap and discrimination in the labour market. 
4.3 Estimation and interpretation of Earnings Functions and Measuring 
Wage Differentials 
Two separate regression models on the two groups (male and female) and one pooled 
regression were estimated using Stata Version 8. Furthermore, a Heckman two- stage 
model was run on the pooled sample of men and women, so that sample selection bias 
in the gender-wage analyses is controlled for. Selection bias is the introduction of 
error due to systematic differences in the characteristics between those individuals 
selected and those not selected into a given study. According to Kennedy (1998) the 
existence of selection bias can be investigated by testing the coefficient of the 
expected error term (measured by lambda) from the Heckman two-stage procedures. 
A significance of the coefficient on the selectivity term (inverse mills ratio) indicates 
the presence of selectivity bias. On the other hand, if the coefficient on the lambda 











As shown in Appendix 1, we estimated the two-stage Heckman model for the entire 
sample. The results from the combined earnings function confirmed that lambda (-
0.1854721) was insignificant. The standard e rror for lambda was 0.1633803 and t-
value was -1.14. This implies that there is no serious sample selection bias. 
Moreover, the F values of the models are significant at all conventional levels 
showing that the three models are statistically significant and the variables have the 
right signs. 
According to Erichen and Wakford (2001) the semi-logarithmic functional form of 
the earnings function enables the interpretation of the coefficient of a given 
continuous variable measures as the constant proportional or relative change in the 
dependent variable for a given absolute change in the value of that independent 
variable l4• 
The majority of the independent variables were statistically significant in each case. 
The effects a nd interpretation of each variable are incorporated in the model given 
below. The interpretation of all the dummy variables will follow Halvosen and 
Palmquist (1980) I 5. 
4.3.1 Results from Pooled Earnings Function 
As indicated in table 14 below the human capital variables (education and experience) 
appear to be significant determinants of wage. All the coefficients of the educational 
spline were positive and significant at 1 % level .One additional year in primary, 
secondary and tertiary education resulted in about 5.20 %, 7.77 %, and 5.58 % 
increase in the gross mean monthly wage. 
14 In(W) == a + fJX <:=:> ea e /1x the derivative of In(W) with respect to X equals fJ ,The derivative of W with respect 
to X is given by: aw / ax = eePX fJ == WfJ 
Thus aln(W)/ ax == fJ == w-1aw / ax 











This implies that the rate of return on secondary education was higher than the rate of 
return on primary as well as tertiary education. 
Moreover. the coefficients for experience and experience-squared variables were with 
expected sign and significant at 1 % leveL An additional year of experience 
(evaluated at the average years of experience) resulted in a 1.80 % increase in gross 
monthly wages. Furthermore, the negative sign on the experience-squared variables 
indicates that wage increases over time occur at a decreasing rate. This complies with 
the explanation from human capital theory. The hours of work per week variable was 
also positive and significant at 1 % leveL This implies that for every additional hour 
of work higher wage was offered 
From the regressions results, most of the dummy variables representing marital status, 
fighter status (whether one participated in the struggle for independence or not), 
occupation, industry, employer and towns (place of work), appear to be significant at 
conventional levels. Moreover, majority of the signs of the coefficients were in line 
with the apriori expectations specified in chapter three. 
Table 14: Pooled earnings function 
Variables Coer. 
Elementary &Junior education 0.052001 * 
Secondary education 0.077675* 
Tertiary education 0.05579* 
P.work Experience 0.030538* 












Professional & technical 0.15219* 































































Government &executive official 0.112945 0.0887714 1.27 -0.107 
Clerical works -0.00161 0.0441965 -0.04 -0.002 
Sales workers -0.16761 0.0726286 -2.31 -0.154 
Service workers -0.31788* 0.0451236 -7.04 -0.272 
Military 0.466651* 0.0936378 4.98 0.595 
Agriculture/fishing -0.011052 0.0685764 0.16 -0.011 
Production & related 0.135376* 0.0426974 3.17 0.145 
Transport equipment operators 0.179238* 0.0453679 3.95 0.196 
Afar -0.01154 0.0494137 -0.23 -0.011 
Billen -0.000219 0.0544185 0 -0.0002 
Hedarb -0.20533 0.2332627 -0.88 -0.186 
Kunama -0.14135** 0.0601365 -2.35 -0.132 
Nara -0.05387 0.0534763 -1.01 -0.052 
Rashiada 0.993076** 0.3703868 2.68 1.693 
Saho -0.00305 0.0461715 -0.07 -0.003 
Tigre -0.11895* 0.024389 -4.88 -0.112 
Fishing 0.221743** 0.082414 2.69 0.248 
Mining 0.324352* 0.0858828 3.78 0.383 
Manufacturing 0.060342 0.0706006 0.85 0.062 
Energy and water 0.11768 0.0771893 1.52 0.125 
Construction 0.209237* 0.071888 2.91 0.233 
Trade -0.033765 0.0771228 0.44 -0.033 
Hotels and restaurant -0.04402 0.0762806 -0.58 -0.043 
Transport &communication 0.249194* 0.0706358 3.53 0.283 
Finance & real estate 0.305768* 0.075565 4.05 0.358 
Public administration 0.15617** 0.0682742 2.29 0.169 
Education -0.06343 0.0771359 -0.82 -0.061 
Health and social work -0.091392 0.0752523 1.21 -0.087 
Other service activities -0.006528 0.0718062 0.09 -0.007 
Private households -0.25135** 0.0959298 -2.62 -0.222 
Extra territorial organization 0.433526* 0.1003802 4.32 0.543 
Private employee -0.059* 0.0212235 -2.78 -0.057 
Public employee -0.06812* 0.0218526 -3.12 -0.066 
Self-employed -0.1418* 0.0386381 -3.67 -0.132 
Hours worked per week 0.005165* 0.0004791 10.78 0.005 
Widowed -0.16151* 0.0341379 -4.73 -0.149 
Divorced -0.11351 * 0.0262919 -4.32 -0.107 
Never married -0.0934* 0.0214215 -4.36 -0.089 
Fighter 0.330969* 0.0200552 16.5 0.392 
Gender 0.154151 * 0.0195535 7.88 0.167 
Cons 4.679326 0.0921408 50.78 0 
F. 114.89; R-squared. 0.5273; Nz 8033 
* = Signilicant at 1 %;**=Signilicant at S%; ***=Signilicant at 10%. 
Note: omitted variables are, working in Asmara (the capital city), agricultural sector. working as a daily labourer. married, 
belonging to Tigrinya ethnic group, Government, being a fighter. 











To analyse the effect of gender, the variable 'gender' was included as an explanatory 
variable in the model. The intercept dummy for men has a positive impact on the 
gender-wage differential as indicated by the coefficient of the variable 'gender'. This 
means that, male workers enjoyed 15.4 % higher mean gross monthly wage than their 
female counterparts in Eritrea, keeping all other variables constant. 
The gender effect measured from the pooled earning function was equivalent to that 
of African skilled women in South Africa. According to Bhorat (2000), South African 
skilled and semi-skilled African and White women earned substantially lower than 
their male counterparts. Wages were reduced by merely being a female and not by 
differences in the observed average characteristics of men and women. The wage of 
African skilled and semi-skilled women was 15.1 % and 63 % lower than their men 
counterparts respectively. Moreover, the wage of White skilled and semi-skilled 
women was 49 % and 69 % lower than their men counterparts respectively. 
4.3.2 Wald and Heteroscedasticity Test 
After estimating the earning function using ordinary least squares, Wald Adjusted F-
tests was run to check for the joint significance of education, experience, hours 
worked, education, residence, occupation, employer, marital status, ethnic and 
industry. All the variables were collectively significant at 5 % level. Unobserved 
heterogeneity is a statistical problem occurring mainly in all cross-sectional studies 
(e.g. because of different sizes of the units under consideration such as households, 
firms, countries, etc.). Therefore, there is a need to run a heteroscedasticity test. The 
null hypothesis was that the variance of the error term is constant. The result from 











It was corrected usmg White's Heteroscedasticity-consistent-covariance-matrix-
estimation 16. 
4.3.3 Male and Female Earnings Function 
Tables 15 and 16 present the estimation of the earning functions of male and female 
separately. 
Table 15: Male earnings functions 
Inwage Coer. Std. Err. t Dum Int 
Elementary &Junior education 0.0476409* 0.0048102 9.9 
Secondary education 0.0584957* 0.0073098 8 
Tertiary education 0.060618* 0.0038028 15.94 
P.work Experience 0.0316184* 0.0027628 11.44 
P. work Exper Squared -0.0004076* 0.0000438 -9.3 
Adekeyih -0.4343311 * 0.0644379 -6.74 -0.352 
Akurdet -0.0894927*** 0.0445503 -2.01 -0.086 
Assab 0.2474299* 0.0297309 8.32 0.281 
Barentu -0.0241051 0.0582682 -0.41 -0.024 
Decemhare -0.0578591 0.0526052 -l.l -0.056 
Ghinda 0.1148147** 0.050444 2.28 0.127 
Keren -0.0940263** 0.0394239 -2.39 -0.089 
Massawa 0.210251 * 0.0273893 7.68 0.234 
Mendefera -0.4479025* 0.0475997 -9.41 -0.361 
Nakfa -0.2635834* 0.0867641 -3.04 -0.232 
Teseney 0.1655626* 0.0390396 4.24 0.180 
Professional & technical 0.158606* 0.0555278 2.86 0.172 
Administrative & managerial 0.2971566* 0.0585049 5.08 0.346 
Government &executive official 0.2044963*** 0.0948421 2.16 0.227 
Clerical works -0.03411 0.0494578 0.69 -0.034 
Sales workers -0.0974682 0.0840006 -1.l6 -0.093 
Service workers -0.2637112* 0.0540525 -4.88 -0.232 
Military 0.5921492* 0.1012482 5.85 0.808 
Agriculture/fishing -0.0902986 0.0805887 -1.l2 -0.086 
Production & related 0.1802436* 0.0455979 3.95 0.198 
Transport equipment operators 0.2040235* 0.047543 4.29 0.226 
Afar -0.0580246 0.0545301 -1.06 -0.056 
Billen -0.0265293 0.0624397 -0.42 -0.022 
Hedarb -0.2164277 0.2377517 -0.91 -0.195 
Kunama -0.1652258*** 0.0783186 -2.11 -0.152 
Nara -0.0937984 0.065606 -1.43 -0.090 
Rashiada 0.9734138** 0.3784945 2.57 1.647 
16 Regression packages such as STA TA have this fonn built in. Applying regression using White's standard errors is sometimes 
known as heterosckedasticity-robust regression. This means the conventional t and F tests can be applied. For more infonnation 











Saho -0.0428255 0.0519161 -0.82 -0.042 
Tigre -0.1730546* 0.0281586 -6.15 -0.159 
Fishing -0.1246527 0.0930967 1.34 -0.117 
Mining 0.2136936*** 0.1010069 2.12 0.132 
Manufacturing -0.0461793 0.0852165 -0.54 -0.045 
Energy and water -0.0167871 0.0916486 -0.18 -0.017 
Construction -0.0512415 0.0862254 0.59 -0.050 
Trade -0.1587527 0.0916547 -1.73 -0.147 
Hotels and restaurant -0.1022957 0.1036455 -0.99 -0.097 
Transport &corrununication -0.0758019 0.0854338 0.89 -0.730 
Finance & real estate 0.2155247** 0.0918903 2.35 0.241 
Public administration -0.0122688 0.0833818 0.15 -0.012 
Education -0.1965071 0.0944078 -2.08 -0,178 
Health and social work -0,0781315 0.0985431 ·0,79 -0.178 
Other service activities -0.1554196 0.089433 -1.74 -0.144 
Private households -0.6075071 ** 0.2212857 -2,75 -0.455 
Extra territorial organization 0.341113* 0.1221661 2.79 0.407 
Private employee -0,0312699 0.0265131 -1.18 -0.031 
Public employee -0.0487931 0.0265991 -1.83 -0,048 
Self-employed -0.1624028 * 0.0482675 -3.36 -0.150 
Hours worked per week 0.0063634* 0.0006252 10.18 0,006 
Widowed -0.033865 0.0750348 -0.45 -0,033 
Divorced -0.0217382 0.0513672 0.42 -0.022 
Never married -0.0728048** 0.0271099 -2.69 -0.070 
Fighter 0.2575217* 0.0234585 10.98 0.294 
Cons 4.927489* 0.1108784 44.44 000 
F = 55.72; R-squared = 0.4352; N = 4180 
• Significant at I %;"=Significant at 5%; ·"=Significant at 10% . 
Note: omitted variables are, working in Asmara (the capital city). agricultural sector, working as a daily labourer. married, 
belonging to Tigrinya ethnic group, Government. being a fighter. 
Dum Int '" the interpretation of the dummy variables 
Education 
The perfonnance of the education splines for men and women are generally as 
expected. The signs of all the educational spline coefficients are positive and 
significant at 1 % level. This implies that acquiring more education will yield a higher 
rate of return. 
As revealed in tables 16 and 17, the rates ofretum on primary (4.76 %) and tertiary 











and 5.06 % respectively. The rate of return on secondary education for female 
workers is substantially higher than male workers. The rate of return (13.36 %) on 
secondary education for female employees is a bout 7.51 % higher t han the rate 0 f 
return (5.85 %) for male workers. 
The servIce, sales and clerical works are occupations that can be satisfied by 
secondary school graduates. As shown in table 5, the distributions of male and female 
employees in the occupations mention above were 23 % and 62 % respectively. 
Therefore, the economic reason for the high rate of return on secondary education for 
female workers could be that female employees had the opportunity to work 
according to their level of education whereas male high school graduates were forced 
to be unemployed or to work below their educational achievement. 
Experience 
The coefficient of the variables experience and experience-squared variables were 
significant at the I % level in all the estimations performed and have the expected 
signs. The wage increment for one year of experience (evaluated at the average years 
of experience) in the case of female workers is 1.7 % and 1.2 % for male workers17• 
The rate of return to experience for female is therefore marginally higher than the rate 
of return for the m ale workers. That means female employees h ave greater returns 
from experience. Even though the economic reason is not established beyond a doubt, 
perhaps suggesting that the longer that women remain in the labour market the fewer 
the concerns relating to continued labour force attachment. 
Moreover, the negative sign of the experience-squared variable is indicating that the 
wage increase over time occurs at a decreasing rate that complies with the human 
17 To calculate the rate ofretum, we need to take the partial derivative ofln wage with respect to experience and evaluate this 











capital explanation. That means the wage-experience profile have the conventional 
shape. The years of experience at which In wage is maximised are 38.78 and 37.48 for 
male and female respectiveli 8. 
Table 16: Female earnings function 
Variables Coer. Std. Err. t Dumlnt 
Elementary &Junior education 0.043578* 0.0061508 7.09 
Secondary education 0.133564* 0.0105216 12.69 
Tertiary education 0.05066* 0.0065491 7.74 
P. work Experience 0.041423* 0.0041694 9.93 
P.work Exper Squared -0,00059* 0.0000703 -8.34 
Adekeyih -0.13448 0.0738173 -1.82 -0.126 
Akurdet -0.027251 0,0637683 0.43 -0.027 
Assab -0.04449 0.0413216 -1.08 -0.044 
Barentu -0.02147 0.0755564 -0.28 -0.021 
Decemhare -0.008583 0.0648549 0.13 -0.009 
Ghinda -0.074992 0.108751 0.69 -0.078 
Keren -0.09225 0.0512391 -1.8 -0.088 
Massawa 0.124855* 0.0359997 3.47 0.133 
Mendefera -0.21498* 0.0507424 -4.24 -0.193 
Nakfa -0.118423 0.0984673 1.2 0.112 
Teseney 0.249928* 0.0571645 4.37 0.284 
Professional & technical -0.03672 0.2177799 -0.17 -0.360 
Administrative & managerial -0.125034 0.2261093 0.55 0.118 
Government &executive official -0.087929 0.3467573 0.25 -0.084 
Clerical works -0.20977 0.2133136 -0.98 -0.189 
Sales workers -0.40073 0.2408909 -1.66 -0.330 
Service workers -0.5032* 0.2155116 -2.33 -0.395 
Military -0.16437 0.3166268 -0.52 -0.152 
Agriculture/fishing -0.01091 0.2335125 -0.05 -0.011 
Production & related -0.24602 0.2186871 -1.12 -0.218 
Transport equipment operators -0.26337 0.3427785 -0.77 -0.232 
Afar -0.00879 0.1252393 -0.07 -0.009 
Billen -0.01264 0.1150089 -0.11 -0.013 
Hedarb 0 000 
Kunama -0.09943 0.091542 -1.09 -0.095 
Nara -0.0267 0.0901847 -0.3 -0.026 
Rashiada 0 000 
Saho -0.01563 0.105931 -0.15 -0.016 
Tigre -0.00212 0.0575081 -0.04 -0.002 
Fishing 0.448512*** 0.2035735 2.2 0.566 
Mining 0.384725* 0.1649125 2.33 0.469 
Manufacturing 0.251342*** 0.1238178 2.03 0.286 
18 To calculate the years of experience for which Ln wage is greatest. one can differentiate In wage with respect to experience set 
the result equal to zero, and then solve for experience at the stationary point. This yields that level of experience for which In 











Energy and water 0.336093** 0.1443475 2.33 0.399 
Construction 0.482155* 0.137427 3.51 0.620 
Trade 0.364081 ** 0.1426818 2.55 0.439 
Hotels and restaurant 0.1393 0.1230986 1.13 -0.13 
Transport &communication 0.460664* 0.1224265 3.76 0.585 
Finance & real estate 0.37241* 0.1281089 2.91 0.451 
Public administration 0.307796** 0.1157449 2.66 0.36 
Education 0.072729 0.1296059 0.56 0.075 
Health and social work 0.227894 0.1226931 1.86 0.256 
Other service activities 0.171529 0.1211321 1.42 0.187 
Private households -0.01591 0.1336985 -0.12 -0.016 
Extra territorial organization 0.489099* 0.1678111 2.91 0.631 
Private employee -0.13485* 0.0343833 -3.92 -0.126 
Public employee -0.12517* 0.0369191 -3.39 -0.118 
Self-employed -0.10239 0.0627822 -1.63 0.097 
Hours worked per week 0.002784* 0.0007579 3.67 0.003 
Widowed -0.15602* 0.0387753 -4.02 -0.144 
Divorced -0.10865* 0.0312065 -3.48 -0.103 
Never married -0.07203*** 0.0348528 -2.07 -0.069 
Fighter 0.535934* 0.0389651 13.75 0.075 
Cons 4.703937 0.2584136 18.2 0 
F" 50.97; R-squared" 0.6094; N = 1853 
.. = Significant at 1%;"'=Significant at 5%; .... *=Significant at 10%. 
Note: omitted variables are, working in Asmara (the capital city), agricultural sector, working as a daily labourer, married, 
belonging to Tigrinya ethnic group, Government, being a fighter. 
Dum 1m = the interpretation of the dummy variables 
Hours of work 
The coefficients of hours worked for both men and women earnings functions are 
positive and significant a t I % level. This implies that one additional hour worked 
brings about 0.64 % and 0.28 % increase in the wages of men and women 
respectively. The increment in wages as a result of the additional hour of work was 
higher for men than women. 
Place of Work 
With the exception of the regional dummies for Berentu and Decemhare, all other 
regional dummies were significant for men. In the case of men, using working 











it is observed that employees working in Adekehih (35.2 %), Akurdat (8.6 %), Keren 
(8.9 %), Mendefera (36.1 %), and Nakfa (23.2 %) earned significantly less than those 
employees working in Asmara. Even though the economic reason is not established 
beyond a doubt, the reason could be that demand for labour is higher in Asmara 
relative to the other towns. The employment distribution of the Asmara, Adekehih, 
Akurdate, Keren, Mendefera and Nakfa was 27.13 %, 1.82 %, 5.14 %, 7 %, 3.44 %, 1 
% respectively. 
Conversely, employees working in Assab (28.l %), Gindae (12.7 %), Massawa (23.4 
%), and Tesenay (18 %) were observed to be earning significantly higher than those 
employees working in Asmara. The employment distribution of Asmara was higher 
compared to the other towns mentioned above. The reason could be the harsh weather 
conditions of the towns (these towns are ports in the western and the eastern low -
lands of Eritrea). That is to say, because of the harsh weather condition the supply of 
labour might be less than the demand, and that hence the wage in these towns was 
higher compared to Asmara. 
From the female regression equation, it can be seen that only three of the proxies for 
regional dummies were significant. The remaining regional dummies were 
insignificant. Keeping all other variables constant, employees working in Mendefera, 
were observed to be earning 19.3 % lower than those employees working in Asmara. 
The reason could be because employment opportunity is higher in Asmara (27.13 %) 
than in Mendefera (3.44 %). Wages were higher for those employees who worked in 
Massawa (13.3 %) and Teseney (28.4 %) rather than those employees who worked in 
Asmara. The employment distribution for the three towns is 27.13 %, 21.64 %, 7.6 % 
respectively. Wages in Massawa and Teseney were higher compared to Asmara for 












All the coefficients for occupational dummies, except for social work, in the female 
regression model were insignificant. The coefficient for social works is significant but 
negative. Using daily labourers, and holding all other variables constant, social 
service workers earned 39.5 % lower than the daily labourers. 
Furthermore, in the case of male employees, those who worked in professional and 
technical, administrative and managerial, government and executive official, military, 
production and related and transport equipment operators earned 17.2 %, 34.6 % 22.7 
%, 80.8 %, 19.8 %, 22.6 % respectively higher than daily labourers, keeping all 
variables constant. 
On the other hand, service workers earned 23.2 % less than those employees in daily 
labourers. During the time of the survey, many big construction projects like the 
Sembel Housing and Massawa Korean projects were paying decent wages for daily 
labourers (the wages of daily labourers were inflated because of the high demand). 
Most likely a large portion of the service workers were government employees who 
were paid low wages. 
Ethnicityl9 
The coefficients of three dummy variables for ethnicity in the male regression 
equation are significant. Taking employees belonging to the Tigrigna ethnic group as 
a base category - ceteris paribus employees belonging to the K unama and Tigre 
ethnic group earned 15.2 %, 15.9 % respectively, lower than employees belonging to 
the Tigrigna ethnic group. In addition, employees belonging to the Rashaida ethnic 
group earned 1 65 % higher than those employees belonging tot he T igrigna ethnic 











group. This is because there were only two Rashaida employees in the sample 
representing the ethnic group (the mean gross wage was obtained by averaging their 
earnings).All the coefficients for the ethnic dummy variables in the female earnings 
function are insignificant. 
Industry 
The industrial dummy coefficients for fishing, mining, manufacturing, energy and 
water, construction, trade, transport and communication, finance and real estate, 
public administration and extra-territorial organizations are positive and significant in 
the female earning equation. Using agriculture industry as the base case, and holding 
all the other variables constant, employees working in the industries mentioned above 
earned 56.6 %, 46.9 %, 28.6 %, 40 %, 62 %, 43.9 %, 58.5 %, 45.1 %, 36 %, 63.1 % 
higher than those employees who worked in agricultural industry respectively. 
Likewise, male employees who were working in the mining, finance and real estate, 
and extra territorial organizations industries, earned 13.17 %, 24.05 % and 40.65 % 
higher than those employees in the agricultural industry respectively, keeping all other 
variables constant. Moreover, employees in private household earned 45.5 % lower 
wages than in the agricultural industry respectively. 
Employer 
Only one of the coefficients of the employer dummies (self employed) is significant 
but negative in the case of male's regression model. Taking government as the base 
variable, the self-employed were earning 17.66 % lower than those employees who 
were employed b y t he government, keeping all the 0 ther variables constant. In the 
female regression model, the coefficients of the employer dummy variables for 
private and public are significant at 1 % level but negative. Using government as base 
case, and keeping all other variable constant, employees in the private and public 











government. This implies that there is a public sector wage premium operating in the 
Eritrean labour market. 
Marital Status 
As far as the male and the coefficient of the marital dummies are concerned only the 
never married dummy variable is significant but negative. Using wage of married 
employees as base case, the mean wage of never-married employees was 15 % lower 
than the mean wage of the married workers, ceteris paribus. As stated earlier the 
economic reason could be family responsibility. If one is married he or she has a 
responsibility to feed the family and this pushes him or her either to work more hours 
in their current occupation or search for a better paying job. 
Interestingly, the coefficients for the marital dummies for female are all significant 
but negative. It is also observed that the wage of the widowed, divorced, and never 
married was lower by 14.4 %, 10.3 % and 6.9 % respectively than the mean wage of 
married women employees. The economic reason might be because married women 
got more employment opportunity (35.77 %) compared to never married (26.11 %), 
divorced (24.66 %) and widowed (13.44 %). 
Fighter 
The dummy for fighter is positive and significant at 1 % level for both male and 
female coefficients. Employees, who belong tot he fighter group, keeping a 11 0 ther 
variables constant, enjoyed 29.4 % higher wages than those employees who do not 
belong to the fighter group, Likewise, the wages for female workers belonging to the 











4.3.4 Structural Test 
After estimating the two earnings functions for male and female workers need to run a 
Chow test to check if the two functions are structurally different. The Chow-test was 
significant at the I % level (F =6.27878/° suggesting that the parameters in the male 
equations were significantly different from those in the female equations, which 
further implies that the male and female earnings functions are structurally different, 
hence the gender-wage differential can be measured using the Oaxaca-Blinder (1973) 
decomposition technique. 
4.3.5 Measuring Gender Pay Gap 
Tables17 and 18 present the log the gender-wage differential measured usmg 
equations (4) and (5) respectively. 
Table 17: Measuring gender-wage gap eq (4) 
VarX Mean of Male Mean of Female CoefofMale Coef of Female H Capital Discrimination 
(Xm) (Xf) (Bm) (Bf) Bm(Xm-Xf) Xf(Bm-Bf) 
edulevl 5.5255 4.7280 0.0476 0.0436 0.0380 0.0192 
edulev2 1.4817 1.3055 0.0585 0.1336 0.0103 -0.0980 
edulev3 0.9464 0.4760 0.0606 0.0507 0.0285 0.0047 
exper 23.8420 20.8743 0.0316 0.0414 0.0938 -0.2047 
exper2 792.6000 606.7458 0.0004 -0.0006 -0.0758 0.1082 
town I 0.0182 0.0259 -0.3448 -0.1617 0.0027 -0.0047 
lown3 0.0514 0.0367 0.0895 -0.0273 0.(0)) 0.0043 
town4 0.1575 0.1176 0.3369 -0.0717 0.0134 0.0481 
townS 0.0304 0.0453 0.0654 -0.0487 -0.0010 0.0052 
town6 0.0273 0.0329 0.0316 -0.0187 -0.0002 0.0017 
town7 0.0371 0.QI08 0.2043 0.0477 0.0054 0.0017 
town8 0.0700 0.0594 -0.0045 -0.1195 0.0000 0.0068 
IOwn9 0.2164 0.1840 0.2997 0.0976 0.0097 0.0372 
town 10 0.0344 0.0594 -0.3584 -0.2422 0.0089 -0.0069 
town I I 0.0100 0.0140 -0.1741 0.0912 0.0007 -0.0037 
town12 0.0760 0.0745 0.2551 0.2227 0.0004 0.0024 
ocepl 0.1126 0.1371 0.1586 -0.0367 -0.0039 0.0268 
ocep2 0.0507 0.0216 0.2972 0.1250 0.0086 0.0037 
20 Chow-test was run as follows: 
(essl ( ess2 + ess3)/k) / (ess2 + ess3 ) / « N2 + N3) 2*k»,where ess I is the elTor sum of squares from the pooled 
(constrained) regression, ess2 and ess3 are the elTor sum of squares from the separate regressions, k is the number or estimated 

















































































































































































































































































The log gross monthly wage of male employees was 1.34969 and the equivalent 
geometric mean was Nakfa 6.21. For the women the log gross monthly wage was 











resulting log wage differential was, 0.41406921 , and the mean In wage difference was 
Nakfa 0.548991422 . 
Table 18: Measuring gender-wage gap eq (5) 
VarX Mean of Male Mean of Female CoefofMale CoefofFemale H Capital Discrimination 
(Xm) (XC) (Bm) (BC) Bf(Xm-XC) Xm(Bm-BC) 
edulev1 5.5255 4.7280 0.0476 0.0436 0.0348 0.0224 
edulev2 1.4817 1.3055 0.0585 0.1336 0.0235 -0.1112 
edulev3 0.9464 0.4760 0.0606 0.0507 0.0238 0.0094 
exper 23.8415 20.8743 0.0316 0.0414 0.1229 -0.2337 
exper2 792.6017 606.7458 -0.0004 -0.0006 -0.1089 0.1414 
lown1 0.0182 0.0259 -0.3448 -0.1617 0.0013 -0.0033 
town3 0.0514 0.0367 0.0895 -0.0273 -0.0004 0.0060 
town4 0.1575 0.1176 0.3369 -0.0717 -00029 00644 
town5 0.0304 0.0453 0.0654 -0.0487 0.0007 0.0035 
town6 0.0273 0.0329 0.0316 -0.0187 0.0001 0.0014 
town7 0.0371 0.0108 0.2043 0.0477 0.0013 0.0058 
town8 0.0700 0.0594 -0.0045 -0.1195 -0.0013 0.0081 
town9 0.2184 0.1840 0.2997 0.0976 0.0032 0.0437 
town10 0.0344 0.0594 -0.3584 -0.2422 0.0060 -0.0040 
town11 0.0100 0.0140 -0.1741 0.0912 -0.0004 -0.0027 
town12 0.0760 0.0745 0.2551 0.2227 0.0003 0.0025 
occp1 0.1126 0.1371 0.1586 -00367 0.0009 0.0220 
occp2 0.0507 0.0216 0.2972 0.1250 0.0038 0.0087 
occp3 0.0103 0.0016 0.2045 0.0879 0.0008 0.0012 
occp4 0.1164 0.2267 0.0341 -0.2098 0.0231 0.0284 
occp5 0.0194 0.0205 -0.0975 -0.4007 0.0005 0.0059 
occp6 0.0916 0.3718 -0.2637 -0.5032 0.1410 00219 
occp7 0.0086 0.0022 0.5921 -0.1644 -0.0011 0.0065 
occp8 0.0521 0.0567 -0.0903 -0.0109 0.0000 -0.0041 
occp9 0.3928 0.1576 0.1802 -0.2460 -0.0579 0.1674 
occp10 0.0877 0.0016 0.2040 -0.2634 -0.0227 0.0410 
ethn1 0.0265 0.0081 -0.0580 -0.0088 -0.0002 -0.0013 
elhn2 0.0220 0.0097 -0.0265 -0.0126 -0.0002 -0.0003 
ethn4 0.0146 0.0286 -01652 -0.0994 0.0014 -0.0010 
elhn5 0.0220 0.0270 -0.0938 -0.0267 0.0001 -0.0015 
ethn7 0.0301 0.0113 -0.0428 -0.0156 -0.0003 -0.0008 
ethn8 0.1439 0.0443 -0 1731 -0.0021 -0.0002 -0.0246 
ind2 0.0165 0.0043 0.1247 0.4485 0.0055 -00053 
ind3 0.0206 0.0092 0.2137 0.3847 0.0044 -0.0035 
ind4 0.1535 0.1468 -0.0462 0.2513 0.0017 -0.0457 
ind5 0.0426 0.0167 -00168 0.3381 0.0087 -0.0150 
ind6 0.1461 0.0281 0.0512 0.4822 0.0569 -00629 
ind7 0.0540 0.0340 -0.1588 0.3641 0.0073 -0.0282 
ind8 0.0182 0.0961 -0.1023 0.1393 -00109 -0.0044 
21 The log differential (0.414069) was found by adding the two components of the decomposition results i.e. 0.3476 and 0.0665 
or by subtracting the log wage of women from the log wage of males (1.34969 -0.935621). 
22 The mean wage difference (0.5489914) was found by subtracting the mean In female wage from the mean In male wage (6.21 











ind9 0.1956 0.0880 0.0758 0.4607 0.0496 410753 
ind10 0.0390 0.0416 0.2155 0.3724 .{).0010 .{).0061 
indl1 0.1499 0.1738 0.0123 0.3078 .{).0074 .{).0443 
ind12 0.0526 0.0621 ,{),1965 0.0727 .{).0007 ,{),0142 
ind13 0.0258 0,1128 .{).0781 0.2279 '{)0198 ,{),0079 
ind14 0.0385 0.1063 '{)1554 01715 '{)0116 '{)0126 
ind15 0,0017 0.0302 .{).6075 .{).0159 0.0005 '{)0010 
ind16 0.0072 0.0070 0.3411 0.4891 0.0001 .{).0011 
empll 0.3517 0.3157 .{).0313 '{).1348 .{).0048 0.0364 
empl3 0.2109 0.1360 .{).0488 .{),1252 '{)0094 0.0161 
empl4 0.0418 0.0432 ,{),1624 .{).1024 0.0001 .{).0025 
f02bq13 48,6945 44,8910 0,0084 0.0028 0.D106 0.1743 
mari2 0.0127 0.1344 '{)0339 .{).1560 0.0190 0,0015 
mari3 0.0270 0.2466 0.0217 ,{),1086 0.0239 0.0035 
mari4 0,2957 0.2612 .{).0728 .{).0720 '{),0025 .{).0002 
Fighter 0.1804 0.1311 0.2575 0.5359 0.0264 .{).0502 
Sum 0.3396 0.0745 
Table 19 shows the estimates of the endowment and treatment components obtained 
by employing the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition formulas of equations (4) and (5). 
Combining all ethnic groups within the age range of 15-65, and who worked full time, 
female employees earned, on average, about 6623 % of what men earned in 1997. 
Table 19: Decomposition results using log wage differential 
Male - Female Log Wage Differential 0.41407 
Oaxaca-Blinder 
Decomposition Equation 
(4) Male Coefficient 
(5) Female Coefficient 













Endowment differential: The first column of figures in table 19 shows the logarithmic 
wage differential due to mean difference in endowments (ie.difference in the average 
2J The antilog of the difference in log differential i.e. -0.41407 (equal to the ratio of female and male mean earnings) equals 











characteristics of education, experience, industry and occupation, type of employer, 
marital status, hours worked, etc) between men and women. According to equations 
(4) and (5) from 82 % to 84 % of the difference of the log wage differential is 
explained by the difference in endowments between male and female workers in 
1997. The overall mean differences in endowments can be seen to account for more 
than three quarters ofthe wage gap according to the analysis above. 
Treatment differential: The second column in table 19 shows the contribution of 
discrimination to the gender-wage gap. According to equations (4) and (5) the 
contribution of discrimination varies from about 16 % to18 % respectivell4• This 
confirms that women's pay is depressed by discrimination in the Eritrean labour 
market because the unequal treatment in the labour market accounts for a significant 
portion of the pay gap. 
As suggested by Lissenburgh (2000), the figure for discrimination stated above can be 
interpreted as the percentage increase in wage that female employees would receive, 
given their stock of human capital attributes, if they were remunerated according to 
the male pay structure. It therefore represents the increase in women's pay that would 
occur if discrimination was avoided. 
The Eritrean labour market results are explained by the fact that women in the sample 
have much lower average endowments (including not only differences in formal 
education and experience, but also a number of other characteristics) than men, which 
accounts for almost the entire male-female wage gap. Discrimination explained only a 
small portion of the wage gap implying that it is not a serious problem. 
14 Chiplin and Sloane (1982: 85) suggested that the true measure of discrimination is likely to lie closer to the male estimate, Le. 












4.6 Empirical Findings 
On the empirical side of labour market discrimination, a number of studies have been 
carried out. To better understand the extent of the gender-wage differential and the 
sources of the wage gap in the Eritrean labour market, the following studies from 
South Africa (carried out by Isemonger and Roberst, 199925, and Ethiopia, Cote 
d'Ivoire and Uganda studied by Appleton et aI, 199926) are considered. 
To standardize the comparison, the studies considered were those that employ the 
Oaxaca-Blinder (1973) decomposition technique (apply the female and male wage 
structure) and have the basic human capital specification i.e. education and 
expenence. 
As displayed in table 20 below, all studies show that women in Africa earned less 
than their men counterparts. Women in Uganda, Cote d'!voire, Ethiopia and South 
Africa earned 61 %, 96 %, 74 % and 75 % of what their men counterparts earned 
respectively .The ratio of female to male earnings in Eritrea is relatively low 
compared to the other country's female -male earnings ratio. 
25 The data set examine for the study was derived from the Saldru study (Saldru 1994) 'South Africans Rich and Poor: Baseline 
Household Statistics', which detail the returns of 9000 South African households surveyed during a nine month period ending in 
April 1994, 
26 The Ethiopian data was taken from the 'Survey of Adolescent Fertility, Reproductive Behaviour and Employment Status of the 
Youth PopUlation in Urban Ethiopia," conducted in June 1990, The Ivorian data was taken from the Living Standards Surveys of 











Table 20:Survey of empirical findings of FIM earnings ratio of different countries 
Ethiopia Cote d'ivoire Uganda South Africa Eritrea 
Female-male earnings ratio 0.74 0.96 0.61 0.75 0.66 
Using Equillion (5) 
Endowments ·9 139 -15 -25 82 
Discrimination 109 38 115 125 18 
Using Equation (4) 
Endowments -19 312 26 -134 84 
Discrimination 119 212 74 237 16 
More than 100 % of the female -male earnings ratio in Ethiopia was explained by the 
unequal treatment in the labour market. Difference in human capital between men and 
women was a not a problem. Moreover, in Uganda from 74 % to 115 % of the female 
-male earnings ratio was attributed to discrimination in the labour market and the 
remaining from 15 % to 26 % was attributed to human capital differences between 
men and women. The South African study showed that women in South Africa earned 
75 % of what their men counterparts earned. Difference in human capital was not a 
problem. In fact, according to Winter (1998), women possess more mean years of 
schooling than their men counterparts. However a significant portion (from 125 % to 
237 %) of the gender-wage gap was explained by discrimination in the labour market. 
In addition, in Cote d'Ivoire female -male earnings ratio was very small. That is, 
women in Cote d'Ivoire earned 96 % of what men earned. However the small female 
-male earnings ratio was attributed to more than 100 % difference in human capital 
and the remaining from 38 % to 212 % to discrimination. 
Unlike Uganda, Ethiopia and South Africa in Eritrea a significant portion of the 
gender-wage gap was explained by differences in human capital between men and 











labour market was small compared to the three countries mentioned above. However, 
the female -male earnings ratio of Eritrea, explained by the differences in human 
capital and discrimination, is small in both cases compared to the Cote d'Ivoire. 
4.4 Critique of the Oaxaca-Blinder (1973) model 
Measuring the gender-wage differential and discrimination usmg Oaxaca-Blinder 
(1973) decomposition has the following limitations: 
Over or under estimation of the extent of discrimination 
Measuring the gender-wage differential and discrimination usmg Oaxaca-Blinder 
(1973) decomposition requires proper accounting for, presentation and accurate 
measurement of the agreed upon variables. If all the relevant observable differences 
between men and women cannot be controlled for, then differences in the wages of 
men and women will be erroneously interpreted as the result of discrimination. 
Sometimes, even though it is established that the acceptable variables that should be 
included in the model, because of data limitation relevant variables may be omitted 
(such as ability, family background, and luck). Each omitted variable's influence is 
reflected in the residual (unexplained component), which may cause an 
overestimation of the extent of discrimination. 
Differences in observable characteristics may themselves be the result of 
discrimination. For instance, education might reflect pre-labour market discrimination 
by parents that may underestimate the extent of post-labour market discrimination or 
over-estimate the productivity difference. 
Moreover, all the relevant variables might be included, but they may be poorly 
measured such as experience. Most of the time, because it is difficult for researchers 











of education -6) for each individual. However, Altonji and Blank (1999) argue that 
calculating the potential experience using the standard Mincerian formula is 
misleading. This is because the above equation implicitly assumes that all people are 
working during all their adult years when they are not in school. This is not true in 
reality. Some people do not find a job and others; for instance, women withdraw from 
the labour market because of family responsibilities. This also understates the extent 
of discrimination by overstating the extent of productivity differences. 
Index number problem 
The index number problem can be expressed as follows. How much would women 
earn if they were paid according to the male wage structure, or how much would men 
earn if they were paid according to the female wage structure? 
Many studies measuring the gender-wage differential employ equation (4), assuming 
in the competitive market (in the absence of discrimination) women will be paid 
equally like their men counterparts. In this study, if men and women are unequally 
treated, it was assumed it is because employers are exercising discrimination. 
However, Neumark (1988) presents a different argument, mainly that employers may 
offer different wages because they may practice nepotism and discrimination. If 
employers exercised favouritism (such as nepotism) women are p aid a competitive 
wage while men are paid above the competitive wage. I n this case the coefficients 
from the female earnings function reflect the non-discriminatory wage structure. If 
employers exercise discrimination men will be paid the competitive wage but women 
will be underpaid. In this case the coefficient from the male earning function will 
estimate the non-discriminatory wage structure. Therefore a proper decomposition 
depends on the type of discrimination hypothesized27 • 
27 Neumark (1988) shows that the non-discriminatory wage structure can be estimated from earnings function estimated over the 











As suggested by Appleton (1999) the decomposition can be quite sensitive to the 
wage structure employed but none of the two is preferable to the other a priori. Also, 
as shown in table 19 above, the gender-wage gap study in the Cote d'Ivoire revealed 
that 38 % of the wage gap was due to discrimination using the male wage structure 
but a 212 % differential using the female wage structure. 
In addition, the gender-wage gap and the sources of the gender-wage gap are also 
sensitive to whether one uses the log wage differential or the mean wage difference. 
For instance, when the gender-wage gap in Eritrea is estimated using log differential 
is found to be 0.414096, implying that women earned 66 % of what men earned -
whereas using the mean log differential is found to be 0.54896 implying women 
earned 58 % of what men earned. The gender-wage gap estimated using the two ways 
affects the estimation of the extent of discrimination and human capital differences 
between male and female. As shown in table 22 below, of the gender-wage gap 62 % 
to 63 % can be explained by differences in human capital between men and women, 
and the remaining 37 % to 38 % can be attributed to discrimination exercised in the 
labour market. The non-homogenous estimation will therefore affect the 'dosage' of 
corrective measures that should be taken regarding each components of the gender-
wage gap. 
Table 21: Decomposition results using mean log wage differential 
Mean Male - Mean Female Log Wage Differential = 0.5489628 
Oaxaca-Blinder Endowment Treatment 
Decomposition Equation Differential Differential 
(4) Male Coefficient 0.34761 0.20135 
(63.33) (36.68) 
(5) Female Coefficient 0.33960 0.20936 
(61.86) (38.14) 
Percentage of Wage Differential in Parentheses 
(nepotistic or discriminatory) toward different types of workers. For more infonnation see the non-discriminatory decomposition 
model. 












From the descriptive and econometric analyses, it was observed that there is a gender-
wage differential between male and female employees. However, this wage gap that 
existed between the two groups was elicited from both the supply side (that is 
differences in human capital investment in the form of education, experience) and 
unequal treatment in the labour market. To be more specific, women employees in 
1996/7 earned about 66 % of the men workers. From this figure about 82 % of the 
difference could be attributed to differences in the average characteristics of men and 
women (including not only differences in formal education and experience, but also a 
number of other characteristics) between male and female employees whereas the 
remaining 18 % was attributed to the unjustified discrimination practiced in the 
Eritrean labour market. 
From the descriptive statistics it was 0 bserved that male employees possess higher 
average education, experience and work more hours in the week than their female 
counterparts. Moreover, male workers (except for experience) enjoyed higher rewards 
in the labour market for each additional endowment they possess. Female employers 
were observed to earn (except for service workers) substantially less than their male 
counterparts across and within each 0 ccupation and sector. Hence, given t he lower 
education level, experience, working hours it is not surprising those female employees 
on average earned less than men in Eritrea. 
The results from the wage equation of female workers showed that human capital 
followed by the variable fighters (a dummy for those who participated in the army 
struggle or not), hours worked per week, marital status, industrial sectors, and type of 
employer were significant determinants of wage. Place of work and occupations were 
the least significant while ethnicity was insignificant in the wage determination 
process of the female employees. The human capital followed by the variable fighter, 











wages. Ethnicity, industrial sectors, employer and marital status were least important 












SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
5.1 Summary and Implications 
This study measuring the gender-wage differential and discrimination in Eritrea 
represents one of the first attempts to shed light on the detennination of wages since 
Eritrean independence. Both the descriptive statistics and econometric analysis of the 
gender-wage gap reveal that women earned significantly less than men in the labour 
market. The gender-wage gap was observed to be higher for those workers in the 75th 
percentile where male wage equals Nacfa 811 and female Nacfa 456. Women in the 
50th percentile earned 56 % of what men earned. Moreover, women's nominal wages 
were, on average, 61 % of men's nominal wages during the survey. 
Econometric analysis with data on education, experience, experience squared, hours 
of work per week, place of work, occupation, industry, employer, marital status, 
fighter and ethnicity concluded that these measurable factors account for much, but 
not all of the log wage differential between men and women in the Eritrean labour 
market. 
The results from decomposition show that women earned about 66 % of what men 
earned in 1997. About 82 % of the gender-wage gap can be explained by differences 
in human capital between men and women and the remaining 18 % was attributed to 
unequal treatment (discrimination) in the labour market. In other words, more than 
three quarters of the gender-wage gap was explained by human capital difference 
between men and women in 1997. As we have shown, women, on average, possessed 











The relevance of human capital and experience were consistently significant for men 
and women in the determination of wages in Eritrean labour market. Interestingly, the 
rate of return on secondary education was higher than the rate of return on primary 
and tertiary education. Moreover, the rates of return on primary and tertiary education 
were higher for male employees than for female workers. The rate of return on 
secondary education for female workers is substantially higher than for male workers. 
The rate of return (13.36 %) on secondary education for female employees was about 
228 % higher than the rate of return (5.85 %) for male workers .The rate of return to 
experience for women was marginally higher than the rate 0 f return for men. This 
means experience overcompensated women. Moreover women, on average, worked 
fewer hours per week than men, and the rate of return of one additional hour of work 
was higher for men than women. 
Most of the dummy variables representing marital status, fighter, occupation, 
industry, employer and towns (place 0 f work) e thnicity, appear to be significant at 
conventional levels. In addition, fighters (both men and women) earned more than the 
non-fighter employees. The dummy for fighter is positive and significant at 1 % level 
for both male and female coefficients. Although the consideration of non-economic 
factors applies to both male and female fighters employees, because the proportion of 
male fighters was 38 % than the female fighters, the dummy variable 'fighter' was 
influencing the wage gap as a group. 
The result suggests the existence of a significant gender-wage gap in Eritrea mainly 
caused by differences in average characteristics of men and women and unequal 
treatment (discrimination) in the labour market irrespective of the presence of 
legislation against it. According to Chapter 4, section 5 (article 65: 1) of the Eritrean 
Labour proclamation (2001, Revised). the law states that "Women may not be 
discriminated against as regards to opportunity or treatment in employment and 













Having realised that more than three quarters of the gender-wage gap which prevailed 
in the Eritrean labour market could be attributed to differences in the average 
characteristics (including human capital, i.e., education and experience) between men 
and women there is need to: 
a) Increase investment in education (especially in secondary education), and motivate 
female students to join the highly rewarding fields like engineering in order to control 
the gender gap that may arise from studying different fields. This means that steering 
female toward male fields may help balance wages. Special assistance can be offered 
if women are found to be weak in mathematics and related skills. 
b) Investigate the factors (such as military service, home responsibilities) which 
prevent potential female employees from attending secondary and tertiary education. 
c) Schools should also do away with gender stereotyped teaching materials dealing 
with family and home responsibilities. 
e) Provide market-oriented educatiOn/training and incorporate employers in the 
curriculum development programme to facilitate access to and return of women in the 
labour market 
Employers 
As discussed III the literature reView, employers are sometimes responsible for 
unequal treatment practices in the labour market. Employers can affect the wages of 
female employees directly by compensating difference or indirectly by clustering 
female employees into low-paying jobs and by not opening equal chances of enjoying 
on-the-job training. Employers, whose main concern may be profit, might not 











look at things from a micro-level perspective. They are not aware of the macro-level 
effect of their individual decisions. Therefore, the concerned institutions need to 
reveal the significance of the problem to employers on the following issues through 
the media and other institutions (such as employers' associations): 
a) Migration effect: Search and migration are activities that increase the value of 
one's human capital through increasing the price (wage) received for a stock of skills. 
If equally productive female workers are not rewarded equally to their male 
counterparts, they might leave the country and society and the country would be the 
poorer. 
b) Feedback effect on education of women: What happens in the market place affects 
the potential and the current employees' decision of investment in themselves. If 
potential female employees observe that their investment in education is not rewarded 
well because of non-economic factors such discrimination, they will not be motivated 
to invest in themselves. 
c) Inequality and growth effect: The existence of the gender-wage differential would 
imply that disparities in wages would be a source of inequality and aggravated 
poverty between groups in society. 
Government 
The government as a key player in the Eritrean economy should do the following to 
solve or minimise the gender-wage gap in the economy: 
a) The government should stipulate policies in good collaboration and understanding 











b) Follow-ups are needed in the event that employers are reported or caught applying 
discriminatory policies. In such cases, they must be punished strictly. Examples 0 f 
such punishments might be revoking employers' licenses (if they are private 
enterprises) after short notice or tough disciplinary actions in financial term taken 
against those managers who practice discrimination against women employees. 
c) Government should offer incentives in the form of tax exemption and rending 
training services to those firms or organizations that employ more women employees, 
especially in male-dominated occupations. Employers should be motivated to explore 
ways to make work schedules more flexible and explore new types of child-care 
provision (within the limits of their budgets) in order to ensure that employees with 
family responsibilities have equal access to all occupations and promotion 
opportuni ti es. 
c) Wage policies should take into consideration the factors that are related to 
productivity. Wages are the price of labour. Considering non-economic factors in the 
wage determination process would affect the productivity of labour and aggravate 
inequality and thereby reduce the economic growth of the country. If any form of pay-
back is needed, it would be advisable that it takes other forms of compensation 
outside wages. 
Society 
Important factors outside the labour market that affects women's labour market 
performance and opportunities are beliefs and cultural practices. The organisation of 
family life in society may cause segregation of occupations. It is believed that family 
responsibilities have negative and positive effect on human capital investment and 
occupational segregation respectively. In Eritrea, the care of children and family 
members still appears to be largely the responsibility of women. This responsibility 











advancement in a number of occupations that routinely require overtime, job related 
travel and inflexible or irregular hours. 
The prevalent belief that women rather than men should be primarily accountable for 
children and family care might contribute negatively to attitudes toward female 
workers and to discrimination against them in nearly all occupations and work 
situations causing occupational segregation. Societal stereotyping (i.e. labelling 
occupations as male or female occupations) might be a serious cause of segregation in 
the workplace. As long as societal stereotyping continues, it will be a good cover for 
the persistence of gender-wage discrimination. Therefore it is necessary to: 
a) Change attitudes of society in general and the female workers in particular. 
b) Motivate parents to positively influence their daughters and invest their boy and 
girl children equally. 
In this case the national media, literature, live drama, religious institutions, and the 
educational system can playa leading role in achieving this goal. 
5.2 Conclusion 
This section concludes the discussion on measuring the gender-wage differential and 
discrimination. The discussion started by raising the following questions: Is there a 
significant gender-wage differential prevailing in E ritrean labour market? W hat are 
the variables that can explain the variation? To what extent does discrimination 
explain the discrepancy? What kind of public policies should be put in place or 
advocated for to correct this distortion in the Eritrean labour market? 
In an endeavour to answer the questions above there was a need to look for the 
possible alternative theories that already attempted to explain the potential sources of 
gender-wage differentials. The discussion started off with the supply-side theories. 
Human capital and other supply-side theories argued that the sources of wage 











of human capital such as schooling, work expenence and on-the-job training, 
difference in group preferences, innate difference (such as physical strength, ability), 
and pre-labour market discrimination practised by parents. However, theories outside 
the neo-classical paradigm suggested the sources of the gender-wage differential to be 
compensating differences, market imperfection, occupational segregation and labour 
market segmentation. 
No one theory is dominant in explaining the gender-wage gap. Some countries' 
labour market may show a strong dominance of one theory over another, given the 
economic configuration and society's own history. In the case of Eritrea, given the 
strong cultural norms that prescribe women to do non-market jobs like child-rearing 
and take responsibility for the family and the incapability of employers to know the 
productivity of potential employees, pre-labour market discrimination theory and the 
ignorance of employers (statistical discrimination theory) could to some extent 
explain the gender-wage gap in Eritrean labour market. 
For an accurate investigation of the sources of the gender-wage differential, all the 
potential sources of the wage gap must be considered; hence all the measurable 
variables that were available in the Income and Expenditure Household Survey of 
1997 were considered. To come up with the measure of discrimination firstly, three 
wage equations were estimated. The equations included a pooled equation for both 
men and women and two separate equations for men and women. The conventional 
Oaxaca-Blinder (1973) decomposition technique was then used to decompose the 
wage differentials. 
Moreover the descriptive analysis confirmed that women across and within the sectors 
and occupational groups earned less than what men earned in 1997.The 
decomposition results revealed that women in Eritrea earned 66 % of what men 
earned. About 82 % of the log wage differential was explained by variation of average 











education and experience, but also a number of other characteristics). On average, 
women's stock of human capital attributes is smaller than that of men. In the sample, 
working men had an average of 23 years experience compared to 20 for working 
women. Male employees had about a year and a half more schooling than female 
workers. 
Overall, mean differences in average characteristics of men and women can be seen to 
account for about three quarters of the pay gap according to the above analysis. The 
remaining 18 % of the gender-wage differential is attributed to unequal treatment 
practised in t he I abour market (discrimination). This confirms that women's pay i s 
still depressed by discrimination in the Eritrean labour market. 
Finally, it was discovered that there exists a significant gender-wage gap in Eritrea 
compared to Uganda, Ethiopia, South Africa, and the Cote d'Ivoire. The main source of the 
gender-wage gap was found to be differences in the average characteristics of male and 
female employees in Eritrea. Moreover, the existence of unequal treatment in the labour 
market was also proved. Therefore, government intervention is required in order to begin 
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Appendix 1: Estimating earning function using Heckman two stage 
[95% 
Var x Coef. Std. Err. z P>z Conf. Interval) 
edulev1 0.0532205 0.0037992 14.01 0 0.0457742 0.0606667 
edulev2 0.0773226 0.0060047 12.88 0 0.0655537 0.0890915 
edulev3 0.0556123 0.0032713 17 0 0.0492007 0.062024 
exper 0.0305836 0.0022463 13.62 0 0.026181 0.0349862 
exper2 -0.0003759 0.0000358 -10.5 0 -0.0004462 -0.0003057 
town 1 -0.3349944 0.0489516 -6.84 0 -0.4309378 -0.239051 
town2 -0.0458421 0.0364531 -1.26 0.209 -0.1172889 0.0256048 
town4 0.1576311 0.0240436 6.56 0 0.1105065 0.2047557 
town5 -0.0210688 0.0468908 -0.45 0.653 -0.1129731 0.0708355 
town6 -0.0417413 0.0416195 -1 0.316 -0.123314 0.0398315 
town 7 0.134037 0.0444132 3.02 0.003 0.0469886 0.2210853 
town8 -0.0860872 0.0316794 -2.72 0.007 -0.1481776 -0.0239968 
town9 0.1791246 0.0216815 8.26 0 0.1366296 0.2216195 
town 1 0 -0.3516705 0.0354878 -9.91 0 -0.4212254 -0.2821157 
town11 -0.0908277 0.0662051 -1.37 0.17 ·0.2205873 0.0389319 
town12 0.1972204 0.0323971 6.09 0 0.1337233 0.2607176 
oeepl 0.0214064 0.0328698 0.65 0.515 -0.0430172 0.08583 
oeep2 0.1400929 0.0386959 3.62 0 0.0642504 0.2159354 
oeep3 -0.0165473 0.080788 -0.2 0.838 -0.1748888 0.1417943 
oeep4 -0.1302174 0.0258954 -5.03 0 -0.1809714 -0.0794634 
oeep5 -0.3034422 0.0603052 -5.03 0 -0.4216381 -0.1852462 
oeep6 -0.4478826 0.0266879 -16.78 0 -0.50019 -0.3955753 
oeep7 0.3318924 0.0858984 3.86 0 0.1635346 0.5002502 
oeep8 -0.1206021 0.0582044 -2.07 0.038 ·0.2346807 -0.0065235 
ethnl -0.0240232 0.049073 -0.49 0.624 -0.1202045 0.072158 
ethn2 -0.0037473 0.0542173 -0.07 0.945 -0.1100113 0.1025167 
ethn3 -0.2045002 0.2324264 -0.88 0.379 -0.6600477 0.2510472 
ethn4 -0.1466412 0.0599043 -2.45 0.014 -0.2640515 -0.0292309 
ethn5 -0.0557112 0.0532733 -1.05 0.296 -0.1601249 0.0487026 
ethn6 0.978158 0.3690402 2.65 0.008 0.2548524 1.701463 
ethn7 -0.0027174 0.0460057 -0.06 0.953 -0.0928869 0.0874521 
ethn8 -0.1181019 0.0243011 -4.86 0 -0.1657312 ·0.0704727 
ind2 0.2425108 0.0819373 2.96 0.003 0.0819167 0.4031048 
ind3 0.3411994 0.0853279 4 0 0.1739597 0.508439 
ind4 0.0666043 0.0698452 0.95 0.34 -0.0702898 0.2034985 
ind5 0.1255612 0.0767685 1.64 0.102 -0.0249023 0.2760247 











ind7 0.0324328 0.076495 0.42 0.672 -0.1174945 0.1823602 
ind8 -0.0457792 0.0760049 -0.6 0.547 -0.194746 0.1 031875 
ind9 0.2364344 0.0699818 3.38 0.001 0.0992727 0.3735962 
indIO 0.3068564 0.0752905 4.08 0 0.1592897 0.4544231 
indl1 0.160803 0.0680193 2.36 0.018 0.0274876 0.2941184 
ind12 -0.0622805 0.0768605 -0.81 0.418 -0.2129244 0.0883634 
ind13 0.0942464 0.074982 1.26 0.209 -0.0527156 0.2412083 
ind14 0.0092991 0.0715451 0.13 0.897 -0.1309268 0.1495249 
ind15 -0.2558911 0.0955441 -2.68 0.007 -0.443154 -0.0686281 
ind16 0.4396387 0.0999787 4.4 0 0.2436842 0.6355933 
empll -0.0526079 0.0210761 -2.5 0.013 -0.0939163 -0.0112995 
emp13 -0.0753298 0.0216863 -3.47 0.001 -0.1178342 -0.0328255 
emp14 -0.1313918 0.0384038 -3.42 0.001 -0.2066619 -0.0561218 
f02bq13 0.0053216 0.0004751 11.2 0 0.0043905 0.0062527 
mari2 -0.1618857 0.0340803 -4.75 0 -0.2286818 -0.0950896 
mari3 -0.1143419 0.0262727 -4.35 0 -0.1658354 -0.0628483 
mari4 -0.0920399 0.0213422 -4.31 0 -0.1338698 -0.0502099 
Fighter 0.3301525 0.0199821 16.52 0 0.2909883 0.3693166 
gender 0.1510893 0.0195174 7.74 0 0.112836 0.1893427 
cons 4.797381 0.0858811 55.86 0 4.629057 4.965705 
















Appendix2A: Mean wages by ethnic groups and gender 
Ethnic Male Female Total %OfMale 
Afar 687.1 I 594.21 675.78 86.48 
Billen 448.16 397.11 439.4 88.61 
Hedareb 348.78 0 348.78 0 
Kunama 406.08 292.89 352.03 72.13 
Nara 376.82 275.55 340.81 73.12 
Rashaida 988.54 0 988.54 0 
Saho 566.22 391.95 540.26 69.22 
Tigre 448.59 445.77 448.26 99.37 
Tirigna 674.18 366.39 570.11 54.35 
Average 615.15 376.14 541. 78 61.15 
Appendix 2B: Mean Monthly wages of employees by place of work alld gellder 
Place of Work Male Female Total %OfMale 
Adikeih 425.68 299.14 374.41 70.27 
Akurdet 414.18 344.47 397.2 83.17 
Asmara 671.82 402.42 577.45 59.9 
Assab 812.99 427.25 721.22 52.55 
Barentu 483.49 351.1 428.16 72.62 
Decemhare 602.1 384.45 525.67 63.85 
Ghinda 489.38 317.6 469.05 64.9 
Keren 455.76 290.42 4\0.71 63.72 
Massawa 661.67 363.04 581.98 54.87 
Mendefera 429.48 252.11 350.48 58.7 
Nakfa 398.07 440.11 415.02 110.56 
Tesseney 512.53 317.05 454.39 61.86 
Average 615.15 376.14 541.78 61.15 
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